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1. Introduction 
The  global  integration  of  capital  markets  has  been  one  of  the  biggest 
stories  in the  world  economy  in recent  decades.  International  asset  trade 
offers  several  potential  benefits.  Countries  can  share  risks  via  interna- 
tional  portfolio  diversification;  the  efficient  allocation  of  capital  to  the 
most  productive  location  is promoted;  and  consumption  can be smoothed 
across  time  periods  in response  to shifts  in macroeconomic  fundamentals. 
While  risk  sharing  may  be  largely  accomplished  through  gross  interna- 
tional  asset  trade,  net  capital  flows  will  typically  be  required  for the  latter 
two  functions. 
With  respect  to  net  asset  trade,  the  empirical  literature  initiated  by 
Feldstein  and  Horioka  (1980)  has  focused  on  the  evolution  of  current 
accounts  across  countries  and  through  time,  highlighting  the  degree  of 
comovement  between  national  saving  and  domestic  investment.  An- 
other  branch  of  the  literature  has  investigated  whether  net  capital  flows 
respond  appropriately  to  cyclical  macroeconomic  shocks,  most  promi- 
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nently  in the literature that has  tested  present-value  models  of the cur- 
rent account  (see Obstfeld  and Rogoff,  1996). 
In this  paper,  we  instead  turn our attention  to the  stocks of external 
assets  and  liabilities,  studying  the  long-term  factors driving  the  evolu- 
tion  of  countries'  net  external  positions.  Our  interest  in  this  subject, 
which  has  received  much  less  attention  in the  literature,  is based  on  a 
number  of  considerations.  First,  international  macroeconomic  theory 
suggests  that  a host  of  long-term  fundamentals  can  lead  to  countries 
becoming  persistent  international  net creditors or international  net debt- 
ors.  Such  long-term  factors  can  be  missed  if  emphasis  is  exclusively 
placed  on  current-account  imbalances,  even  using  long  spans  of  data: 
for instance,  a country  may  run persistent  current-account  deficits  but 
still be  reducing  its external  liabilities  relative  to GDP. Second,  if long- 
term  factors  are important  in  determining  net  foreign-asset  positions, 
short-term  flows  cannot  be properly  understood  unless  the  constraints 
imposed  by  long-run  equilibrium  conditions  are  explicitly  taken  into 
account.  For example,  the  implications  of  a country's  current-account 
deficit  depend  on  whether  it is  moving  the  country  towards  or away 
from its target long-run  net foreign-asset  position. 
Why  then  has  little attention  been  devoted  to studying  such  longer- 
run issues?  Paucity of data on foreign-asset  and -liability stocks has been 
a traditional  barrier to research  on  net  foreign-asset  positions.  Only  a 
few  countries  have  published  reliable  estimates  of accumulated  stocks, 
whereas  current-account  data have been much more widely  available. In 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a), we have employed  a uniform methodol- 
ogy  to generate  estimates  of foreign-asset  and  -liability positions  for a 
large number  of industrial  and developing  countries  over the past three 
decades.  This dataset  enables  us to analyze  the behavior  of net foreign- 
asset  positions  in a more  comprehensive  manner  than  in the efforts  of 
previous  researchers. 
We address  three questions  about net foreign-asset  positions.  First, we 
try to explain their behavior, across countries and over time, investigating 
why  some  countries  are net  creditors  and others  net  debtors,  and why 
some  creditors  turn into debtors,  like the United  States,  and vice versa, 
like Singapore.  Identifying  the long-term macroeconomic  forces underly- 
ing the endogenous  determination  of net foreign-asset  positions  provides 
insight  into  the  role  played  by  international  financial  integration  in 
allowing  countries  to delink national production  and consumption. 
Second,  we  identify  two  mechanisms  that link trade balances  to net 
foreign-asset  (NFA) positions.  One  key  channel  is that  changes  in the 
target long-run  NFA position  are an important  force driving  the current 
account.  The other is that,  for a given  desired  NFA position,  a country 
that enjoys  high  returns  on its foreign  assets  and pays  out low  returns Long-Term  Capital  Movements * 75 
on its foreign liabilities can afford to run a smaller trade surplus (or larger 
trade deficit).  In this way,  we  highlight  the  role of a state variable (the 
NFA position)  in determining  the dynamics  of the trade balance. 
Third,  we  explore  the  relation  between  NFA positions  and  the  real- 
interest-rate  differential.  This is an old question  in the portfolio-balance 
literature: do debtor countries pay a risk premium? The traditional litera- 
ture attempted  to link currency return differentials  to outstanding  rela- 
tive stocks of national  money,  but much less  research has been  directed 
at linking  differences  in real interest  rates across  countries  to long-run 
net foreign  asset positions  (Frankel and Rose,  1995). 
The structure  of the  rest of the paper  is as follows.  In Section  2, we 
briefly discuss  the broad properties  of our dataset of foreign  assets  and 
liabilities.  The determination  of long-run  NFA positions  is investigated 
in Section  3. Section 4 models  the short-run  dynamics  of the NFA posi- 
tion  and the behavior  of the trade balance.  We turn in Section  5 to the 
relation between  the NFA position  and the real-interest-rate  differential. 
Conclusions  and directions  for future  research are offered  in Section  6. 
2.  International  Balance  Sheets:  Stylized  Facts 
2.1 METHODOLOGY 
A country's  net  external  position  is the  sum  of net  claims  of domestic 
residents  on nonresidents.  In line with the way in which transactions are 
recorded  in  balance-of-payments  statistics,  we  classify  external  assets 
and liabilities into three main categories: foreign direct investment  (FDI), 
portfolio  equity  (EQ), and  debt  instruments  (DEBT). Foreign  exchange 
reserves  (FX) belong  in this last category, although  we  keep  them  sepa- 
rate in  the  overall  accounting.  Hence  we  define  net  foreign  assets  as 
follows: 
NFAit = FDIAit + EQAit + DEBTAit + FXi, -  FDILit -  EQLit -  DEBTLit,  (1) 
where  the  letter A indicates  assets  and  the  letter L liabilities.  The FDI 
category reflects a "lasting interest" of an entity resident in one economy 
in an enterprise  resident  in another economy  (IMF, 1993). This includes 
greenfield  investment  as well  as equity participation giving  a controlling 
stake (typically set at above  10%), while  remaining  equity purchases  are 
classified under portfolio equity investment.1  The debt category includes 
trade credits, bank loans,  and portfolio  bond instruments. 
1. This implies  that in certain cases the distinction  between  these two categories can in fact 
be blurred, but the issue  cannot be clarified further in the absence  of detailed  disaggre- 
gated data. 76 *  LANE  & MILESI-FERRETTI 
For most  industrial  countries,  estimates  of  stocks  of  external  assets 
and liabilities  are published  by national  authorities  and collected  by the 
IMF and  the  OECD,  but  coverage  starts for most  countries  only  in the 
early eighties.  The corresponding  measure  of NFA is called  the interna- 
tional investment position (IIP). For developing  countries,  however,  com- 
prehensive  stock data are generally  available  only for external debt and 
foreign exchange  reserves; IIP availability is limited,  especially  along the 
time-series  dimension.  In addition,  the methodologies  used  to estimate 
the various  stocks of equation  (1) often differ across countries  (for exam- 
ple,  book  or market  value  for equity  and  FDI),  making  cross-country 
comparisons  more difficult. 
In order  to  overcome  the  limitations  in  existing  data,  we  have  con- 
structed data on external assets and liabilities for 66 industrial and devel- 
oping  countries,  covering  the period  1970-1998.  We discuss  in detail the 
methodology  we  use  for estimating  net  external  positions  in Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti  (2001a). Broadly speaking,  we  rely  on  stock  data,  when 
available,  supplemented  by cumulative  flows  data, with appropriate val- 
uation  adjustments.  The latter are particularly  important  given  the  in- 
creased  role played  by  portfolio  equity  and  FDI flows  during  the  past 
decade. 
The  use  of  flow  data  can  be  better  understood  by  considering  the 
fundamental  balance-of-payments  identity,  which  states that the current 
account,  net  financial  flows,  and  changes  in foreign-exchange  reserves 
sum to zero,  with  a term capturing  "net errors and omissions"  acting as 
the balancing  item.2 Financial flows  can be divided  between  FDI, portfo- 
lio equity,  and  debt  flows,  plus  a term capturing  capital-account  trans- 
fers,  which  include  debt  forgiveness  operations  and  other transactions 
that do not give rise to a corresponding  asset or liability. The evolution  of 
net  claims  on  the  rest of the  world  is dictated  by the flows  of new  net 
claims-which  equal the current account balance net of capital transfers 
TR'-and  by capital gains and losses  KG on existing  claims: 
ANFAt  =  CAit  +  TR'  +  KGit.  (2) 
Our first measure  of NFA, CUMCA,  is available for all countries  and is 
obtained  by  cumulating  current-account  balances,  net  of capital  trans- 
fers, with  appropriate  adjustments  designed  to take into account  valua- 
tion effects,  debt reduction  and debt forgiveness,  and other terms sub- 
sumed  in KG. For example,  we  adjust  the  outstanding  stock  of equity 
2. We assume  that errors and omissions  reflect changes  in the debt assets held by country 
residents  abroad,  in line  with  the  capital-flight  literature.  See  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
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assets  and liabilities so as to reflect variations in the U.S.$  value of stock- 
market  indices,  and  the  stocks  of  inward  and  outward  FDI to  reflect 
changes  in the cross-country  prices of capital goods.  A comparison  with 
existing data on stocks of external assets and liabilities provides  a satisfac- 
tory robustness  check on our methodology. 
For  developing  countries,  we  also  construct  a  second  measure, 
CUMFL, that is  obtained  as the  sum  of  stocks  of the  various  external 
assets  and liabilities,  calculated  as adjusted  cumulative  capital flows  or, 
as is the case for external debt and foreign  exchange  reserves,  as direct 
stock  measures.  As  is  explained  in  detail  in  Lane  and  Milesi-Ferretti 
(2001a), our CUMCA measure  implicitly  considers  estimates  of cumula- 
tive  unrecorded  capital  flows  as  assets  held  by  the  country  residents 
abroad.  CUMFL instead  includes  unrecorded  capital  outflows  only  to 
the degree  that they are reflected in net errors and omissions,  and hence 
a lower  fraction of unrecorded  external capital holdings  than CUMCA.3 
We use these  measures  to supplement  the existing  IIP data. 
Before turning  to the presentation  of the data, it is important  to point 
out  that the  measurement  of international  current and  capital transac- 
tions faces severe  problems,  in particular underrecording  of exports and 
capital outflows,  reflected  in the existence  of a measured  "world current 
account  deficit"  (over U.S.$70  billion  in  1998). These  problems  are un- 
avoidably  reflected in our data, which  make use of official sources; even 
though  we  try  to  take  account  of  unrecorded  capital  outflows  to  the 
extent possible,  external assets  are as a whole  underreported. 
2.2 NET  FOREIGN  ASSETS:  BROAD  TRENDS 
The distribution  of countries between  large and small creditors and debt- 
ors in 1975, 1986, and  1997 is depicted  in Figure 1.4 In industrial  coun- 
tries  as  a whole  the  dispersion  of net  external  positions  has  increased 
3. For developing  countries,  the  CUMCA  measure  determines  the  stock  of  debt  assets 
residually,  after subtracting  from  the  estimated  net  external  position  the  net  FDI and 
equity  positions  and the difference  between  reserves  and external  debt.  To understand 
the  difference  with  CUMFL, consider,  for example,  the  case  of a country  with  a trade 
deficit entirely financed by a flow of new  debt liabilities (and errors and omissions  equal 
to zero).  Assume,  as has often  been  the case in developing  countries  during periods  of 
capital flight,  that the  change  in the  stock  of external  debt  (measured  by World Bank 
data)  exceeds  the  recorded  debt  inflow  in  the  balance  of payments.  Cumulating  the 
current account  (as in CUMCA)  implies  that the change  in the net  external  position  is 
equal to the recorded flow  of new  debt,  and thus  implicitly assumes  that the difference 
between  the change in the stock of debt and the flow is offset by an accumulation  of debt 
assets  of the country  abroad. If debt assets  are instead  estimated  directly as cumulative 
flows  (as is the case for CUMFL), the change  in the net external position  corresponds  to 
the increase in the stock of external debt. 
4. We focus here just on the overall NFA position.  See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b) for a 
discussion  of the composition  of the external capital structure. 78 *  LANE  & MILESI-FERRETTI 
Figure 1 DISTRIBUTION  OF NET FOREIGN-ASSET  POSITIONS: 
(a) INDUSTRIAL  COUNTRIES;  (b) DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
-20%NFA<-10%  -10%<NFA<0 
(a) 
I 
Lt.  I 
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(b) 
Plot of the number  of countries  with net foreign-asset  position in the given range on the given year. 
during  the  past  25 years,  with  an increase  in  the  number  of  relatively 
large debtors,  especially  between  1975 and  1986, and  in the number  of 
creditors with assets  above  10% of GDP. For developing  countries,  there 
is a large increase in the number of countries with  large external liabilities 
(over 40% of GDP) between  the 1970s and the 1980s, in the aftermath of 
the debt crisis.  More generally,  a pattern  of increased  dispersion  in net 
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Figure  2  plots  different  NFA  measures  as  a  fraction  of  GDP  for  a 
selection  of industrial countries for the period  1970-1998.  We graph both 
our estimate  CUMCA  and  the  direct estimate  of NFA (IIP) when  avail- 
able.5 Only a few countries have remained  creditors throughout  the past 
three decades  (Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,  and Switzerland);  the 
rest of the  group  is almost  evenly  split between  persistent  debtors  and 
switchers.  Among  the  latter, the best-known  case  is the United  States. 
Figure 3 plots NFA measures  for some of the developing  nations in our 
sample,  highlighting  a number of interesting  facts. First, the dynamics  of 
external  positions  in  the  countries  most  affected  by  the  debt  crisis  is 
similar, with  a sharp worsening  during  the early 1980s and an improve- 
ment  later in the decade.  Second,  net external liabilities measured  with 
CUMFL are significantly  larger than with  CUMCA  in several  countries 
(Argentina,  Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia),  reflecting unrecorded  capital 
outflows.  The third is the effect of the currency collapse  due to the Asian 
crisis on external liabilities  in Indonesia  and  to a lesser  degree  in Thai- 
land.  Finally, the improvement  of Singapore's  net external position  over 
time is remarkable.6 
3.  The  Determinants  of  Net Foreign-Asset  Positions 
We propose  a parsimonious  reduced-form  model  of the  NFA position: 
bit =  o'Zit  +  Eit,  Zit =  [YCit, GDEBTit,  DEM,t],  (3) 
where  bit  is country i's ratio of NFA to GDP in year t, YCit  is its output per 
capita,  GDEBTit  is its level  of public  debt,  and  DEMit is a set  of demo- 
graphic variables.  As the discussion  in the next subsection  makes clear, 
we have followed  the main themes  developed  in the theoretical literature 
in  selecting  these  variables  as the  primary  determinants  of  NFA posi- 
tions.7 It is important to take note that all variables should be interpreted 
as measured  relative to global values,  since common  movements  in out- 
put  per capita,  demographic  trends,  and  government  debt  should  not 
5. In Lane  and  Milesi-Ferretti  (2001a) we  explain  the  most  relevant  differences  between 
these  two measures. 
6. Taiwan shows  a similar, albeit less dramatic, trend among  the economies  in our sample. 
7. Since we  have  a limited  number  of time-series  observations,  we  are constrained  in the 
number of determinants  that we can include in our empirical work. As detailed in Section 
3.1, these variables can affect NFA positions  through several channels as highlighted  by a 
number  of theoretical  contributions.  Building  an integrative  general-equilibrium  model 
that  would  nest  the  various  hypotheses  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  and  our 
empirical specification  will inevitably  not be able to discriminate between  all competing 
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affect NFA positions,  but rather will operate via global variables such as 
the world  real interest  rate. 
3.1 THEORETICAL  CHANNELS 
Relative output per capita can affect NFA positions  through several chan- 
nels.  First, if the  domestic  marginal  product  of capital decreases  as an 
economy  grows  richer, domestic  investment  will fall and home  investors 
will seek out overseas  accumulation  opportunities.  Second,  an increase in 
domestic  income  may  lead  to a rise in the  domestic  savings  rate. This 
result  is most  clearly generated  in models  with  habit formation  in con- 
sumption  preferences:  as an economy  grows,  consumption  will  lag be- 
hind  output  (see,  for instance,  Carroll, Overland,  and  Weil, 2000).  An 
alternative  explanation  has  been  suggested  by  Rebelo  (1992):  under 
Geary-Stone  preferences,  the savings  rate will  also be increasing  in in- 
come levels, since the marginal utility of extra consumption  sharply dimin- 
ishes once basic consumption  needs  are satisfied.  We note that, even if the 
increase  in the savings  rate is temporary,  there may be a permanent  im- 
provement  in the NFA position.  A positive  relation between  relative out- 
put  per capita and  the  NFA position  is also  captured  in the  traditional 
stages-of-the-balance-of-payments  hypothesis  (see  Halevi,  1971,  and 
Fischer and Frenkel, 1974). 
Although  these  factors  point  to  a positive  relation  between  relative 
output  per capita and the NFA position,  an effect operating  in the oppo- 
site  direction  may  be  at work  in developing  countries  operating  under 
credit constraints.  In models  in which  an improvement  in net worth  or 
cash  flow  relaxes  financial  constraints,  an  increase  in production  may 
allow  greater  recourse  to  foreign  credit,  possibly  implying  a negative 
relation  between  net  external  assets  and  relative  output,  at least  over 
some  interval. 
The second  variable we consider is the stock of public debt. In a world 
that  exhibits  departures  from  Ricardian  equivalence,  higher  levels  of 
public debt may be associated  with a decline in the external position.  For 
instance,  in  the  Blanchard-Yaari  finite-horizon  model,  an  increase  in 
public  debt is not  fully  offset  by  an increase  in private  asset  accumula- 
tion, since public debt is perceived  as net wealth by current generations, 
who  will  bear only  part of  the  tax burden  implied  by  its higher  stock 
(Blanchard, 1985; Faruqee and Laxton, 2000). 
Third, demographic  factors are also potentially  important determinants 
of the net foreign assets.  For instance,  countries with an aging population 
can prepare for an increase in the ratio of retirees to workers by accumulat- 
ing  overseas  assets  to supplement  domestic  income  streams.  Domestic 
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uct of capital is diminished  by a reduction in the growth of (or a decline in) 
the working-age  population  and the labor force. 
At the other end  of the population  distribution,  a society  with  a high 
youth  dependency  ratio may  require heavy  investment  in social  infra- 
structure (education,  housing).  A high youth  dependency  ratio may also 
reduce  the savings  rate, as households  with  children attempt to smooth 
consumption.  Accordingly,  we  may  expect  to  see  a decline  in NFA in 
countries  experiencing  a rise  in  the  youth  dependency  ratio (see  also 
Taylor, 1994; Taylor and Williamson  (1994); Obstfeld  and  Rogoff,  1996; 
Higgins,  1998). 
However,  the  impact  of demographic  factors on  the  NFA position  is 
not just a function  of the youth  and old-age  dependency  ratios, but also 
of the age structure of the working-age  population  (Mundell,  1991). For 
instance,  a relatively young  workforce may be associated  with relatively 
low  saving  and  high  investment,  whereas  an  older  workforce  may  be 
associated  with  a rise in the NFA position,  as the saving-for-retirement 
motive  kicks in and  domestic  investment  falls.  For this reason,  we  will 
employ  the entire age distribution  in our empirical work. 
Finally, some authors have recently modeled  the determination  of NFA 
positions  in  a  stylized  mean-variance  portfolio  framework,  with  the 
demand  and supply  for domestic  and foreign assets being determined  by 
risk and return characteristics  and by the profiles  of investors  (see  Cal- 
der6n,  Loayza,  and  Serven,  2000; Kraay, Loayza,  Serven  and  Ventura, 
2000;  Edwards,  2001).  As  the  preceding  discussion  has  highlighted, 
our fundamentals-output  per capita, public  debt,  and  demography- 
potentially  affect these factors in complex ways.  Among  the channels not 
already discussed,  output  per capita and years to retirement may plausi- 
bly affect the degree of risk aversion.  However,  the relation between  risk 
aversion  and  the NFA position  depends  on whether  the  "safe" asset  is 
domestic  or foreign,  which  is typically  a model-specific  choice. 
3.2 PREVIOUS  EMPIRICAL  WORK 
Masson,  Kremers, and Horne (1994) is one of the very limited number of 
studies  focusing  on the evolution  of NFA.8 In their country studies  of the 
United  States,  Japan,  and  Germany  over  the  period  1960-1985,  they 
relate  NFA  positions  to  the  overall  dependency  ratio and  the  level  of 
government  debt,  but  do  not  include  the  level  of  income  per  capita.9 
8. Halevi (1971)  and Rold6s (1996)  provide some empirical  evidence on the stages-of-the- 
balance-of-payments  hypothesis. 
9. In a study of OECD  countries, Bayoumi  and Gagnon (1996)  also control for fiscal and 
demographic effects, but their primary focus is on the effects of inflation on NFA 
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They  find evidence  of a long-run  relation between  these  variables,  and 
highlight  the role of feedback  mechanisms  working  through  absorption 
in the adjustment  towards  the long-run  equilibrium.  Calder6n,  Loayza, 
and Serven  (2000) relate the evolution  of NFA to composite  measures  of 
risk and return; they find support  for their specification,  particularly for 
countries  with  low barriers to international  capital movements. 
Taylor (1994), Higgins  (1998), and Herbertsson  and Zoega  (1999) have 
provided  some evidence  that demographic  factors are an important driv- 
ing  force  of  medium-term  current-account  behavior.  Herbertsson  and 
Zoega  (1999)  focus  in  particular  on  the  link  between  population  age 
structure  and  public  and  private  saving  behavior:  they  highlight  how 
countries  with  high  youth  dependency  ratios  tend  to  have  larger 
current-account  deficits.10 Employing  a demographic  specification  simi- 
lar to ours,  Taylor (1994) and Higgins  (1998) show  that the demographic 
structure is quantitatively  important in explaining  medium-term  current- 
account behavior. 
3.3 EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS 
Our empirical analysis  of the long-run  behavior  of NFA uses  data for 66 
countries  spanning  the  period  1970-1998.  Throughout  our  empirical 
work,  we  split  the sample  between  industrial and developing  countries.1 
The industrial  countries consist  of long-standing  members  of the OECD, 
which  approximately  correspond  to the most-developed  set of countries 
at the start of the sample  period.  We allow  for potentially  different rela- 
tions between  our fundamentals  and NFA positions  for the two  groups, 
as well  as for differences  in data quality. For instance,  we  have  already 
noted  that the  output  per capita may  exert different  effects  in the  two 
groups,  and the difference  in life expectancy  and in retirement patterns 
means  that demographic  effects  plausibly  will also differ across the two 
samples.  Furthermore,  differences  in the pervasiveness  of liquidity con- 
10. However,  Chinn  and  Prasad  (2000) find  instead  only  weak  evidence  of a systematic 
effect of dependency  ratios on current-account  balances  in a wide  sample  of industrial 
and developing  countries. 
11. Industrial countries  are  the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  Austria,  Belgium- 
Luxembourg,  Denmark,  France, Germany,  Italy, the  Netherlands,  Norway,  Sweden, 
Switzerland,  Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Austra- 
lia, and New  Zealand.  Developing  countries are Turkey, South Africa, Argentina,  Bolivia, 
Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica, the  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  El Salvador, 
Guatemala,  Mexico,  Panama,  Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,  Venezuela,  Jamaica, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Republic, Egypt, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan,  India,  Indonesia,  Korea, Malaysia,  Pakistan,  Philippines,  Singapore, 
Thailand,  Algeria,  Botswana,  C6te  d'Ivoire,  Mauritius,  Morocco,  Zimbabwe,  Tunisia, 
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straints  and  other  sources  of  violation  of  Ricardian  equivalence  may 
induce  differences  in the relation between  net foreign  assets  and public 
debt in the two  groups. 
We use  the following  variables: NFA as a ratio of GDP (CUMCA and 
CUMFL measures,  as well  as  the  IIP measure  for robustness  checks), 
GDP per capita in 1995 U.S. dollars (in log form), the stock of public debt 
as a fraction of GDP, and the shares of population  under 14, over 65, and 
between  15 and 64 (in 5-year cohorts).12 
Public  debt  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  external  public  debt,  net  of 
foreign-exchange  reserves,  and gross  domestic  public  debt.13 For indus- 
trial countries,  the  main  source  of  data  for  public  debt  is  the  OECD 
(general government  definition); for developing  countries,  the data have 
been  constructed  using  the World Bank's Global Development  Finance, 
the IMF's Government  Financial Statistics,  and national  sources.  Unfor- 
tunately,  the  definition  of  government  for developing  countries  is not 
homogeneous-it  can refer to central government,  general government, 
or the nonfinancial  public  sector. When  data availability was  not a con- 
straint,  we  have  used  the  broadest  definition  of  government.  A  data 
appendix  detailing  sources  and definitions  for the debt data is available 
from the authors. 
Finally, population  shares were  constructed  using  the United  Nations 
(2000) Demographic  Yearbook  (Historical Supplement  1948-1997),  supple- 
mented  by data from Herbertsson  and Zoega  (1999).14 
3.3.1  Bivariate  Relations  As a precursor to the multivariate  econometric 
work, we begin in Figures 4-6 by showing  the bivariate relations between 
net foreign-asset  positions  on the one side and output  per capita, public 
debt,  and demographic  structure on the other. In these  graphs,  the data 
are  measured  in  terms  of  average  changes  between  1980-1989  and 
1990-1998,  capturing  the  medium-  or long-term  movement  in country 
12. Ideally,  we would like to measure  net foreign assets relative  to a country's  total  wealth, 
but this would require  data on land values, natural  resources,  human capital, and the 
value of domestic assets. In any event, it is plausible that GDP may serve as a reason- 
able proxy for wealth. 
13. We would of course prefer to use net domestic public debt, but data availability  for 
such a measure is much more limited. Since we focus on time-series behavior, and 
given the strong comovement  between the two measures  for those countries  for which 
they are both available,  we are confident that this choice still allows us to capture  the 
right long-run relation. As we will discuss later, obstacles are more serious when 
undertaking  cross-sectional  analysis,  because of cross-country  differences  in the defini- 
tions of "government." 
14. We thank these authors  for kindly sharing  their data. 86 *  LANE & MILESI-FERRETTI 
Figure 4 NET FOREIGN ASSETS AND  GDP PER CAPITA (AVERAGE 
CHANGE,  1990-1998  OVER 1980-1989):  (a) INDUSTRIAL 
COUNTRIES; (b) DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
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Figure 5 NET FOREIGN ASSETS AND  PUBLIC DEBT (AVERAGE  CHANGE, 
1990-1998  OVER 1980-1989):  (a) INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES; 
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Figure  6 IMPACT OF CHANGE  IN DEMOGRAPHICS  ON  CHANGE  IN  NET 
FOREIGN ASSETS. (AVERAGE  CHANGE,  1990-1998  OVER 1980- 
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positions.15 In each figure,  panels  (a) and  (b) contain  observations  from 
the industrial  and developing  countries  respectively. 
Figure  4a shows  a quite  striking  positive  bivariate  relation  between 
growth in output per capita and improvement  in the NFA position  among 
the industrial nations.  A significant positive  relation between  output per 
capita  and  the  NFA position  is also  evident  in the  developing-country 
sample  in Figure 4b. However,  the  slope  is flatter and  the  overall  fit is 
much  weaker.  We will  return  to  the  difference  in  slopes  between  the 
industrial  and developing  samples  when  interpreting  the results  of the 
regression  analysis  below. 
Figure 5 plots the change in the NFA position  against the change in the 
ratio of public  debt  to GDP. For both  industrial  and  developing  coun- 
tries,  we  observe  an  inverse  bivariate  relation:  growth  in  public  debt 
tends  to be  associated  with  a decline  in the  net  foreign-asset  position. 
We turn to the effect of demographic  structure in Figure 6. This figure 
charts the correlation between  the change  in the NFA position  and the 
change  in the population  shares  in each age cohort  (0-14,  15-19,  .  .  , 
60-64,  65+).  For the industrial  countries,  we  see  that an increase  in the 
youth  dependency  ratio is associated  with  a decline  in the net  foreign- 
asset  position,  as  is  an  increase  in  the  30-49  age  groups  (albeit these 
correlations  are weaker).  There is a twin-peaks  effect here: increases  in 
both  the  15-29  and  50-64  age  groups  are associated  with  an improve- 
ment  in net  foreign  assets.  For the  developing  countries,  the  effect  of 
demographic  structure is more uniform: an increase in the 15-29 popula- 
tion share is associated  with  a decline  in the NFA position,  whereas  the 
30-49  population  share exerts a positive  effect. 
Although  these  scatter diagrams  provide  some  suggestive  evidence, 
the interpretation  of bivariate  relations  of course  should  not be pushed 
too  far. For instance,  there  is a strong  correlation  in the  data between 
demographic  structure and output per capita, both along the time-series 
and  along  the  cross-sectional  dimension,  which  could  explain  the  co- 
movements  of one of these variables with net foreign assets.  To uncover 
whether  all of these  variables play  a simultaneous  role in the dynamics 
of  net  foreign  assets,  we  next  turn  to  panel  regressions  for  formal 
multivariate regression  analysis. 
3.3.2  Panel Fixed-Effects  Regression Analysis  Since  we  are interested  in 
the role played  by shifts in our fundamentals  in explaining  the dynamic 
15. This "cross-section  in first differences"  is essentially a country fixed-effects  specifica- 
tion, picking up intra-country  time variation.  We get similar  graphs if we also employ 
data from the 1970s, but the more recent period offers more complete data and may 
better  capture  behavior  under integrated  capital  markets. 90 *  LANE  & MILESI-FERRETTI 
evolution  of NFA positions,  we  focus  on  a fixed-effects  panel  specifica- 
tion in this sub-subsection  (we consider  the cross-section  evidence  irl the 
next  sub-subsection).  The  country  fixed  effects  also  have  the  merit  of 
soaking up unobserved  variables that may lead to permanent  differences 
in measured  net foreign-asset  positions  across countries.16 To control for 
common  global movements,  in particular of world GDP per capita, demo- 
graphics,  and  public  debt,  we  also  include  time  dummies  in  all  the 
regressions. 
As a precursor  to the regression  analysis,  we  explored  the univariate 
time-series  properties  of the  data.  We tested  for nonstationarity  in our 
series  for net  foreign  assets,  demographic  variables,  government  debt, 
and  log  GDP  per  capita,  using  the  NPT1.1  econometric  package-see 
Chiang  and  Kao  (2000).  The  tests  were  performed  separately  on  the 
industrial-  and  the  developing-country  samples,  using  the  panel  unit- 
root test  of Hadri  (2000) (allowing  for fixed effects  and no  time  trend). 
For all series  in the four samples,  the test rejects the null hypothesis  of 
stationarity. 17  In light  of the evidence  on the presence  of unit roots,  we 
subsequently  tested  for panel  cointegration  among  our variables,  using 
tests  suggested  by  Kao  (1999)  and  Pedroni  (1999).  Both  are residual- 
based  tests  for  which  the  null  hypothesis  is  lack  of  cointegration 
(nonstationarity  of residuals).  These test statistics are reported in Table 1 
and strongly  suggest  the existence  of a cointegrating  relation among  net 
foreign  assets  and our fundamentals. 
Having  ascertained  that  the  variables  display  a common  trend,  we 
follow Stock and Watson (1993) and estimate their long-run relation using 
a dynamic  ordinary  least-squares  (DOLS [-1,1])  specification.18 We re- 
port estimates  for the 1970-1998  and 1980-1998  intervals.  The dataset is 
more complete  for the post-1980s period, and in addition this latter period 
may better reflect an environment  of open  capital accounts.19 
With  respect  to  the  specification,  we  want  to  allow  the  entire  age 
structure  to influence  the net  foreign-asset  position,  but do not wish  to 
estimate  independent  parameters  for our twelve  age cohorts.  We there- 
fore follow  Higgins  (1998) by restricting the  coefficients  on the popula- 
tion  share  variables  to lie along  a cubic polynomial,  so  that only  three 
composite  demographic  variables  need  actually be  entered  into  the  re- 
gression  specification  (see the Appendix  for details). 
16. This may capture  both country-specific  determinants  of net foreign-asset  positions and 
permanent  measurement  errors  in our estimates  of national  net foreign-asset  positions. 
17. Other panel unit-root tests gave broadly similar  results. The unit-root  test results are 
available  from  the authors. 
18. A DOLS[-2,2] specification  gave similar  results. Only leads and lags of output growth 
and changes in public debt are included (including  changes in demographic  variables 
makes no difference).  Standard  errors  are corrected  for heteroscedasticity. 
19. In future  work, we plan to look explicitly  at measures  of capital-account  liberalization. Long-Term  Capital  Movements  ?  91 
Table 1  KAO (1999)  AND PEDRONI  (1999)  COINTEGRATION  TESTS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Industrial  Industrial  Developing  Developing 
1970-98  1980-98  1970-98  1980-98 
Kao (1999)  DF p*-test  10.89  10.42  -15.65  11.62 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.000) 
Kao (1999)  ADF stat., 1 lag  -4.24  -4.48  -4.73  -4.17 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Kao (1999)  ADF stat., 2 lags  -4.36  -4.52  -4.29  -4.61 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Pedroni (1999)  t-stat. for PT  -333.6  -237.1  -472.4  -315.2 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Note:  Cointegration  tests are performed  on the vector  including  NFA, log GDP  per capita,  public  debt, 
and the three composite demographic  variables.  The table reports the value of the statistic,  with p- 
values in parenthesis. The null hypothesis in all tests is lack of cointegration.  DF (ADF) stands for 
(augmented)  Dickey-Fuller. 
Tables 2 and 3 reports  the  results  of the panel  estimation  (with  fixed 
country and time effects) for the industrial- and developing-country  sam- 
ples  respectively.  For the  industrial-country  sample,  we  use  both  our 
measure  of net foreign-asset  positions  (CUMCA) and,  for robustness,  a 
measure  that replaces CUMCA by official international investment  posi- 
tion data where they are available for most of the sample period (CUMCA 
+  IIP). For developing  countries,  we  employ  the  two  alternative  mea- 
sures of the net foreign-asset  position  (CUMCA and CUMFL) described 
in Section 2. We also report results when  Singapore  is excluded  from the 
sample,  since it is an extreme observation  with  respect to its net foreign- 
asset position,  and its role as banking center complicates  considerably  the 
construction  of accurate net-foreign-asset  measures  (indeed,  CUMFL is 
not  available).  Finally, in each  case,  we  also report results  for balanced 
samples. 
For  the  industrial-country  sample,  Table  2  shows  a  consistently 
strong  positive  influence  of  output  per  capita  on  the  net  foreign-asset 
position.  The  stable  point  coefficient  of  about  0.9  means  that  a  10% 
improvement  in a country's  relative output  per capita is associated  with 
a 9-percentage-point  improvement  in  its  ratio  of  net  foreign  assets  to 
GDP. This  result  provides  supporting  evidence  for those  theories  out- 
lined  in Section  3.1 that predict a positive  comovement  between  output 
per capita and net foreign assets. 
If we  consider  the  1970-1998  interval,  the results  for public  debt and 92 *  LANE  & MILESI-FERRETTI 
Table  2  DETERMINANTS  OF NET FOREIGN  ASSETS,  INDUSTRIAL 
COUNTRIES:  PANEL  DOLS  REGRESSIONS  WITH  FIXED  TIME 
AND COUNTRY  EFFECTS 
(5) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  CUMCA 
CUMCA  CUMCA  CUMCA  +IIP  CUMCA  +IIP  Balanced 
1970-98  1980-98  1970-98  1980-98  1972-97 
Log GDP per  0.91  0.91  0.9  0.89  0.94 
capita  (12.63)**  (7.26)**  (12.55)**  (6.71)**  (11.66)** 
Public debt  -0.125  -0.05  -0.124  -0.07  -0.18 
(3.1)**  (0.9)  (3.01)**  (1.1)  (4.54)** 
x2(demog)  30.1  2.3  22.1  4.2  43.6 
(0.00)**  (0.51)  (0.00)**  (0.24)  (0.00)** 
Adjusted  R2  0.89  0.91  0.89  0.93  0.9 
Observations  516  389  516  382  390 
Countries  22  22  22  22  15 
a(Popul. < 15)  -1.47  -0.81  -1.24  -1.2  -2.26 
a(Popul.  >  64)  -0.66  -0.59  -1.29  -0.44  -0.05 
amax  1.41  0.46  1.24  0.63  1.24 
(50-54)  (35-39)  (50-54)  (30-34)  50-54) 
amin  -1.49  -0.81  -1.29  -1.2  -2.26 
(15-19)  (0-14)  (15-19)  (0-14)  (0-14) 
Dynamic  ordinary  least  squares,  t-statistics  in parentheses  [p-value for the x2(demog)  statistic].  * (**) 
indicates  statistical significance  at the 5% (1%) confidence  level.  In regressions  (1) and (2) the dependent 
variable is CUMCA for all countries  except  Belgium,  for which  it is the IIP estimate  of NFA minus  gold. 
In regression  (3) the dependent  variable is the IIP estimate  of NFA for Belgium,  Canada,  Italy, Japan, 
and the United  Kingdom,  and CUMCA for all other countries.  In regression  (4) it is the IIP estimate  of 
NFA for Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Finland,  Germany,  Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,  Spain,  Sweden, 
Switzerland,  the United  Kingdom,  and the United  States, and CUMCA for the remaining  countries.  For 
definition  of a, see  Appendix. 
demographic  structure are also quite strong.  In line with  our theoretical 
prior; net foreign  assets  are negatively  related to the size  of the govern- 
ment debt. The statistically significant  -0.125  point estimate  implies  that 
the  ratio of net  foreign  assets  to GDP falls by  6 percentage  points  in a 
country  that  experiences  a 40-percentage-point  increase  in  its  ratio of 
public  debt to GDP (relative to the world  average),  indicating  that gov- 
ernment  debt is largely absorbed domestically. 
The  relation  between  net  foreign  assets  and  demographic  structure 
also accords with  the thrust of the theoretical  literature: a decline  in the 
net foreign asset occurs if there is an increase in the population  shares of 
younger  age  cohorts,  whereas  the  net  foreign-asset  position  responds 
positively  to an increase in the share of workers nearing retirement,  with Table 3  DETERMINANTS OF NET FOREIGN ASSETS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
PANEL DOLS REGRESSIONS WITH FIXED TIME AND  COUNTRY EFFECTS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
CUMCA  CUMCA  CUMCA  CUMCA  CUMFL  CUMFL  CUMCA 
1970-98  1980-98  1970-98  1980-98  1970-98  1980-98  1977-97 
All  All  No Sing.  No Sing.  No Sing.  No Sing.  Balanced 
Log GDP per capita  -0.21  -0.08  -0.29  -0.2  -0.31  -0.25  -0.26 
(4.59)**  (1.05)  (6.76)**  (2.98)**  (6.8)**  (3.6)**  (3.55)** 
Public debt  -0.67  -0.67  -0.73  -0.71  -0.86  -0.86  -0.50 
(14.03)**  (13.3)**  (16.8)**  (14.6)**  (21.4)**  (19.6)**  (8.87)** 
x2(demog)  28.7  21.2  5.5  4.6  12.7  6.4  38.7 
(0.00)**  (0.00)**  (.14)  (.20)  (.01)**  (.10)  (0.00)** 
Adjusted  R2  0.83  0.87  0.85  0.88  0.89  0.91  0.89 
Observations  779  590  753  572  728  566  416 
Countries  39  39  38  38  38  38  16 
a(Popul.  <  15)  -1.01  -0.38  -0.49  -0.78  -0.9  -1.11  -1.17 
a(Popul.  >  64)  -0.522  0.158  2.05  2.47  4.33  4.6  0.55 
amax  3.92  3.54  2.05  2.47  4.33  4.6  5.66 
(50-54)  (55-59)  (65+)  (65+)  (65+)  (65+)  (55-59) 
amin  -3.92  -3.54  -1.19  -1.1  -1.18  -1.14  -5.67 
(20-24)  (20-24)  (25-29)  (20-24)  (45-49)  (35-39)  (20-24) 
Dynamic  ordinary least squares t-statistics  in parentheses  [p-value for the x2(demog)  statistic]. * (**)  indicates  statistical  significance  at the 5% (1%) confidence 
level.  In regressions  (1)-(4)  the dependent  variable is CUMCA; in regressions  (5) and (6) it is CUMFL. Regression  (3)-(6)  exclude  Singapore  from the sample. 
For definition  of a, see  Appendix. 
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a maximum  effect for the 50-54  age group.  It is also interesting  to note 
that the  over-65  age  group  exerts a negative  effect,  consistent  with  the 
running  down  of net foreign  assets. 
However,  as is evident  from columns  (2) and (4) in Table 2, the signifi- 
cance of the public-debt  and demographic  results is lost if we just look at 
the more recent 1980-1998  period.  With regard to public debt, the weak- 
ening  of the conditional  correlation is due to just one country, Australia, 
where  public debt exhibits a strong positive comovement  with net foreign 
assets.  If Australia is excluded  from the sample,  the coefficient on public 
debt rises to -0.12  and is strongly  statistically significant.  Results for the 
balanced  sample  are similar to those  for the 1970-1998  period for the full 
sample.20 
We next  turn to the results  for the  developing  country  sample.  First, 
across  columns  (1)-(6),  we  observe  a negative  relation between  output 
per  capita  and  the  net  foreign-asset  position:  as  a developing  country 
becomes  richer, it typically  sees  an increase in its net external liabilities. 
The  contrast  with  the  result  for the  industrial  country  sample  is  quite 
striking,  although  the negative  coefficient  is typically  small and is insig- 
nificant  in column  (2). As was  noted  in Section  3.1,  a negative  associa- 
tion between  output  per capita and NFA is consistent  with the relaxation 
of binding  credit constraints  on developing  countries.21 
Second,  Table 3 shows  a very  strong  inverse  relation between  public 
debt and the NFA position.  A point estimate  in the range [-0.67,  -0.86] 
implies  that a 20-percentage-point  increase in government  debt is associ- 
ated with  a [13.4, 17.2]-percentage-point  decline  in NFA. This high pass 
through  from net  government  liabilities  to net external liabilities  is also 
consistent  with  pervasive  credit  constraints  in  developing  countries, 
since credit-market imperfections  are understood  to be a primary source 
of deviations  from Ricardian equivalence  (Bernheim,  1987).22 
With respect to the effect of demographic  structure on the net foreign- 
asset positions  of developing  countries,  the evidence  in Table 3 shows  a 
20. Belgium-Luxembourg,  Denmark,  Finland,  Greece,  Norway,  and Portugal were  drop- 
ped  to obtain a balanced  sample. 
21. Results  clearly  suggest  that  the  relation  between  output  per  capita  and  net  foreign 
assets  over the entire sample  of industrial  and developing  countries  is nonmonotonic. 
To some  extent,  we  capture  a  nonlinear  relation  by  splitting  the  sample  between 
industrial  and developing  countries.  We also tried to capture nonlinearities  within  the 
developing-country  sample  by  positing  the  existence  of  a threshold  level  of income 
(varying  the choice  of threshold),  as well  as by splitting  the  developing-country  sam- 
ple into  richer and poorer  countries  based  on initial or average  income.  However,  no 
strong  evidence  of nonlinearity  emerges  from the  analysis-the  relation with  income 
per capita remains weak  statistically  and economically. 
22. In most  of  the  developing  countries  in  our  sample,  public  debt  was  primarily  con- 
tracted internationally,  given  the shallowness  of domestic  financial markets. Long-Term  Capital  Movements  *  95 
pattern  similar to that for industrial  countries:  an increase  in the popu- 
lation  share  of younger  age  groups  is associated  with  a decline  in the 
net  foreign-asset  position.  A comparison  of the  a-coefficients  between 
the industrial  and developing  countries  also shows  a greater sensitivity 
of  the  net  foreign-asset  position  to  age  structure  in  the  latter  group. 
However,  the  significance  of  these  demographic  effects  is  weakened 
when  Singapore  is excluded  from the  sample.23 Finally, results  for the 
balanced  sample  in  column  (7) are  quite  similar  to  those  for  the  full 
sample,  although  the  magnitude  of  the  public-debt  effect  falls  some- 
what,  to -0.50.24 
We turn now  to examining  how  well  our panel  specification,  which 
imposes  equality  of  all  slope  coefficients  within  our  two  country 
groups,  can match the dynamics  of net foreign  assets  at the individual- 
country  level.  For this  purpose,  Figures  7 and  8 plot  actual and  fitted 
long-run  values  of net foreign assets for selected  industrial and develop- 
ing countries.25 
For  the  richer  countries,  the  graphs  suggest  that  our  specification 
matches the time-series  behavior  of NFA quite well in small open  econo- 
mies,  but does not do as well for Germany, the United Kingdom,  and the 
United  States.  For the last country, public  debt has been  declining  and 
growth  has been strong in the late 1990s, and both factors would  lead us 
to expect an improvement  in NFA. Instead,  the level of U.S. net external 
liabilities  has  increased  substantially  during  this period.26 A similar di- 
verging  pattern between  actual and fitted values  occurs in the late nine- 
ties for Japan, for exactly the symmetric  reason-faltering  GDP growth 
and  rapidly  increasing  public  debt  would  lead  us  to  expect,  ceteris 
paribus, a worsening  in  the  NFA  position,  whereas  Japan's improved 
throughout  the period.27 
For developing  countries,  the  overall  fit shown  in  Figure  8 is  very 
good,  with  very  few  exceptions.  One  is  Venezuela,  which  has  severe 
23. Singapore  has undergone a dramatic  demographic  transition,  with a rapid  aging of the 
population. Of course, this may in fact represent very good evidence regarding  the 
effect of demography on net foreign assets, since Singapore has also been rapidly 
accumulating  external  assets in recent years. 
24. The balanced sample for developing countries excludes Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, 
Botswana,  Brazil,  Chile, C6te d'Ivoire,  the Dominican  Republic,  Paraguay,  Peru, Trini- 
dad and Tobago,  Turkey,  and Zimbabwe. 
25. Graphs for all other countries are available from the authors. The fitted values are 
generated from fixed-effects  panel OLS regressions:  the coefficient  estimates are very 
similar  to those obtained  from the DOLS  specification. 
26. See Obstfeld  and Rogoff (2000)  on the sustainability  of the U.S. external  position. 
27. In part, these patterns can be linked to the increased degree of equity diversification 
across countries:  for example, the strong performance  of U.S. equity markets  during 
the 1990s and the weak performance  of Japanese  markets implied capital gains for 
foreign holders of U.S. equities and losses for foreign holders of Japanese  equities. Figure 7 ACTUAL AND  FITTED VALUES, NET FOREIGN ASSETS, SELECTED INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 
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measurement  problems  for its NFA position  because  of the size of unre- 
corded  assets  held  abroad.  The  divergence  for  Malaysia's  actual  and 
fitted values  in the 1990s is due to the same factors at work in the United 
States: our model  predicts  that fast growth  and  a declining  public  debt 
should  be associated  with  falling external liabilities. 
In summary,  the data suggest  that foreign-asset  positions  in industrial 
countries  exhibit  a strong  comovement  with  relative  output  per capita, 
while  their  quantitative  link  with  public  debt  is  relatively  weak.  Con- 
versely,  public  debt is very strongly  correlated with  the dynamics  of net 
external  liabilities  in  developing  countries,  while  the  relation  with  in- 
come per capita along  the time-series  dimension  is weak  or negative.  In 
addition,  in both  samples,  the demographic  variables  generally  play an 
important  role in determining  NFA positions.  Our simple  econometric 
specification  captures  long-run  trends  in NFA very well  for developing 
countries  and small  open  industrial  economies,  but is less  successful  in 
explaining  the behavior  of NFA in larger countries. 
3.3.3  Cross-Sectional  Evidence  The panel  data analysis  presented  in the 
previous  sub-subsection  has  focused  on  the  evolution  of  net  foreign 
assets  within  countries.  In this sub-subsection,  we  investigate  the cross- 
sectional  relation between  NFA and their determinants,  focusing  on the 
1990s. Table 4 presents  results  of cross-sectional  regressions  of net  for- 
eign  assets  on  log  output  per  capita,  public  debt,  and  demographic 
variables,  where  all  variables  are  averages  during  the  period  1990- 
1998.28 
Relative output per capita is the only significant  variable in explaining 
the cross-sectional  variation in NFA positions  across industrial countries. 
As in the time-series  dimension,  richer countries  have  larger NFA posi- 
tions,  although  the  cross-section  point  estimate  is  40-50%  smaller  in 
magnitude.  Neither  public debt nor demography  is helpful  in explaining 
the 1990s cross section  for industrial  countries. 
Our  fundamentals  are  more  successful  in  explaining  cross-country 
differences  in  net  external  positions  among  developing  countries.  In 
contrast to the time-series  result, we  find a positive  association  between 
output  per  capita  and  NFA  in  the  cross  section,  although  the  point 
estimate  is typically  small  and  not  significant  in column  (6). Similar to 
the time-series  evidence,  the cross-sectional  effect of public debt is nega- 
tive  and  significant:  developing  countries  with  larger public  debts  also 
have larger net external liabilities. Columns  (4)-(6)  also suggest  a signifi- 
28. The results are virtually unchanged  if we focus on a single year, because  these variables 
move  only slowly  from year to year. Table 4  NET FOREIGN ASSETS: CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
CUMCA  CUMCA+IIP  CUMCA  CUMCA  CUMFL  CUMFL 
1990-98  1990-98  1990-98  1990-98  1990-98  1990-98 
Industrial  Industrial  Dev.  Dev.,  no Sing.  Dev., no Sing.  Dev., no Sing. 
Log GDP per capita  0.45  0.54  0.18  0.17  0.15  -1.87 
(3.58)**  (2.92)**  (2.32)**  (2.0)**  (1.6)  (2.93)** 
Log GDP per capita  0.13 
squared  (3.26)** 
Public debt  0.10  -0.11  -0.44  -0.45  -0.65  -0.71 
(0.7)  (0.35)  (4.52)**  (4.47)**  (5.18)**  (6.55)** 
x2(demog)  3.05  2.21  35.3  33.6  36.7  1.35 
(0.38)  (0.53)  (0.00)**  (0.00)**  (0.00)**  (0.28) 
Adjusted  R2  0.45  0.33  0.62  0.57  0.63  0.69 
Countries  22  22  39  38  38  38 
a(Popul.  <  15)  -1.2  394.2  -489.2  -442.3  -276.9  -2.25 
a(Popul.  >  64)  -0.44  -1314.6  1527.8  1389.0  921.8  -0.04 
amax  0.62  424.3  1527.8  1389.0  921.8  1.24 
(30-34)  (15-19)  (65+)  (65+)  (65+)  (50-54) 
amin  -1.2  -1314.6  -511.9  -464.0  -298.1  -2.25 
(0-14)  (65+)  (20-24)  (20-24)  (35-39)  (0.14) 
Ordinary least squares,  heteroscedasticity-corrected  t-statistics  in parentheses  [p-value for the x2(demog)  statistic]. * (**)  indicates  statistical significance  at the 
5% (1%) confidence  level.  In regressions  (1) the dependent  variable is CUMCA for all countries  except  Belgium,  for which  it is the IIP estimate  of net foreign 
assets  minus  gold.  In regression  (2) the  dependent  variable  is the  IIP estimate  of NFA  for Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Finland,  Germany,  Italy, Japan,  the 
Netherlands,  Spain, Sweden,  Switzerland,  the United  Kingdom,  and the United  States,  and CUMCA for the remaining  countries.  Regressions  (3)-(6)  refer to 
the developing-country  sample.  In regressions  (3) and (4), the dependent  variable is CUMCA; in regression  (5) it is CUMFL. Regressions  (4) and (5) exclude 
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cant effect of the demographic  structure on the cross-section  distribution 
of  NFA  positions  among  developing  countries,  with  a pattern  that  is 
qualitatively  similar to that found  in the time-series  data. 
The differences  in the  coefficients  on  income  between  the  industrial 
and developing  sample,  both in the time series and in the cross section, 
suggest  that the underlying  relation between  NFA and output  per capita 
is nonlinear.  We report results  using  a quadratic cross-sectional  relation 
between  output  per capita and NFA for developing  countries  in column 
(7).29 The specification  does  pick up a nonmonotonicity,  but the turning 
point  is at a low  threshold  ($1170); only  8 out of the 38 countries  are in 
the region  in which  the cross-sectional  relation between  output  per cap- 
ita and NFA is slightly  negative.30 
4.  The  Dynamics  of  Net Foreign  Assets  and  the 
Trade  Balance 
In the  previous  section,  we  focused  on  the  long-run  behavior  of NFA, 
arguing that it can be characterized as a cointegrating  relation bit  =  c'Zit  + 
eit. In this  section,  we  shift  our attention  to the adjustment mechanism- 
namely,  the role played  by our long-run  model  in shaping  the short-run 
dynamics  of NFA, as well as the implications  these dynamics have for the 
trade balance. 
4.1 THE  ECM  REPRESENTATION 
Since  the  underlying  long-run  relation  is a cointegration  equation,  we 
can obtain the "desired" change  in NFA,  Abt,  as the fitted values  from 
estimating  an error-correction-mechanism  representation 
Ab,t  = P' AZit  +  r  Abit_l  -  A(bit, -  'Zit-_) +  vit.  (4) 
In order  to  keep  the  model  specification  as parsimonious  as possible, 
we  impose  equality  of  all slope  coefficients  among  the  industrial-  and 
among  the  developing-country  samples  in estimating  this error-correc- 
tion specification. 
Table 5  reports  the  estimated  error-correction  coefficient  A and  the 
overall  fit of equation  (4) for the different  country  groups  and samples. 
The specification  of the regression  also includes  the lagged  change in the 
29. A similar specification  for the whole  sample  gives  statistically  weaker  results,  with  an 
estimated  turing  point below  output  per capita of U.S.$1000.  It makes little difference 
to the results if Singapore  is included  or CUMCA is used  as the NFA measure. 
30. Caution  should  be exercised  in interpreting  these  cross-sectional  results,  because  our 
sample  excludes  low-income  countries,  which  are typically highly  indebted. Long-Term  Capital  Movements * 101 
Table  5  CHANGES  IN NET FOREIGN  ASSETS:  SPEED  OF ADJUSTMENT: 
PANEL  REGRESSIONS,  ERROR-CORRECTION  SPECIFICATION 
(a) Industrial Countriesa 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
CUMCA  CUMCA  CUMCA+IIP  CUMCA+IIP 
1970-98  1980-98  1970-98  1980-98 
Error  correct.  -0.11  -0.17  -0.12  -0.14 
(4.11)**  (4.59)**  (4.23)**  (3.34)** 
Adjusted R2  0.28  0.30  0.27  0.13 
Observations  539  393  537  374 
Countries  22  22  22  22 
(b) Developing Countriesb 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
CUMCA  CUMCA  CUMCA  CUMCA  CUMFL  CUMFL 
All  All  No Sing  No Sing  No Sing  No Sing 
1970-98  1980-98  1970-98  1980-98  1970-98  1980-98 
Error  correct.  -0.06  -0.11  -0.10  -0.16  -0.10  -0.15 
(2.36)*  (2.96)**  (4.99)**  (5.05)**  (4.53)**  (4.66)** 
Adjusted R2  0.44  0.45  0.48  0.50  0.54  0.56 
Observations  849  612  822  594  786  585 
Countries  39  39  38  38  38  38 
Ordinary  least squares, t-statistics  in parentheses [p-value  for the x2(demog)  statistic].  * (**)  indicates 
statistical  significance  at the 5%  (1%)  confidence  level. 
aRegressions  also include the lagged first difference  in CUMCA,  contemporaneous  first differences  in 
the other  variables  belonging  to the Z-vector,  and country  and time dummies.  In regressions  (1)  and (2) 
the dependent variable  is the change in CUMCA  for all countries  except Belgium,  for which it is the 
change  in the IIP  estimate  of NFA minus gold. In regression  (3) the dependent  variable  is the change  in 
the IIP  estimate  of NFA for Belgium,  Canada,  Italy,  Japan,  and the United Kingdom,  and the change  in 
CUMCA  for all other  countries.  In regression  (4)  it is the change  in the IIP  estimate  of NFA for Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United States, and the change in CUMCA  for the remaining  countries. 
bIn  regressions  (1)-(4) the dependent variable  is the change in CUMCA;  in regressions  (5)-(6) it is the 
change in CUMFL.  Regressions also include the lagged first difference  in the dependent variable, 
contemporaneous  first differences  in the other variables  belonging to the Z-vector,  and country and 
time dummies. Regressions  (3)-(6) exclude  Singapore  from  the sample. 
dependent  variable  and  contemporary  changes  in all explanatory  vari- 
ables  (coefficients  not  reported).  Results  show  that  deviations  of  NFA 
from their long-run  trend tend  to be quite persistent,  with  a half-life of 
5-6  years,  and that the speed  of adjustment  is quite similar in industrial 
and developing  countries.  Given the restrictive specification  of the short- 102 *  LANE  & MILESI-FERRETTI 
run dynamics,  the fit of the regressions  is remarkably good,  especially  so 
for developing  countries. 
It is useful  to ask how  well  this simple  specification  accounts  for the 
dynamics of NFA at the individual-country  level. For this purpose,  Table 6 
reports the country-by-country  bivariate correlations between  actual and 
fitted values  for changes  in NFA for the period  1970-1998.  For industrial 
countries,  the model  does poorly in explaining  the short-run dynamics  of 
the  NFA position  for most  of  the  large  economies-Japan,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and the United States-while  it tracks the smaller open econo- 
mies,  such  as Ireland,  Portugal,  and  the  Scandinavian  countries,  quite 
nicely.31 For developing  countries,  the model  performs  remarkably well 
across the board, explaining  a substantial fraction of year-to-year changes 
in NFA, with very few exceptions. 
4.2 IMPLICATIONS  FOR  THE  TRADE  BALANCE 
The factors driving  the NFA position  influence  the behavior  of the trade 
balance  via  two  channels.  First,  changes  in  the  desired  NFA  position 
require  shifts  in  the  trade  balance.  Second,  for  a  given  desired  NFA 
position,  there is an inverse  relation between  the investment  returns on 
the outstanding  stock of NFA and the trade balance. 
In  an  accounting  sense,  changes  in  the  NFA  position  reflect  trade 
imbalances,  investment  income  payments  and receipts,  and capital gains 
and losses.  Formally, 
Bit -  Bit,  =  TBit +  TRCt  +  TRt  +  iitBit-l +  KGit,  (5) 
where  TBi is the balance of trade in goods  and services,  TRt (TRs~)  are net 
current (capital) transfers,  ii,Bt_1  is investment  income,  and  KGit is the 
capital gain/loss  on outstanding  net external assets.  The current account 
is  given  by  the  sum  of  TBit, TR.,, and  the  investment  income  iitBi,_.32 
Dividing  both  sides  of equation  (5) by  GDP measured  in U.S.  dollars, 
adding  together  investment  income  and  capital gains,  and rearranging 
terms,  we  obtain 
Abi  =  tb,  +  trk +  it  kg ib,,  bit  ,,  (6) 
1  +  yit  1  +  yit 
31. One reason why  the model  may not fully capture the dynamics  of the NFA position  for 
the former group of countries  is that these  are financial centers,  and high levels  of gross 
international  asset trade mean that the impact of volatile revaluation effects on the NFA 
position  is likely to be especially  important. 
32. The expression  iitBit_ for investment  income  implicitly assumes  that the dollar yield on 
external  assets  and  liabilities  is  the  same.  We discuss  below  the  implications  of  this 
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Table 6  CORRELATION BETWEEN ACTUAL AND  FITTED CHANGE IN 
NET FOREIGN ASSETSa 
Industrial countries  Observ.  Correlation  Devel. countries  Observ.  Correlation 
Australia  24  0.07  Algeria  8  0.49 
Austria  27  0.80  Argentina  7  0.90 
Belgium  16  0.40  Bolivia  4  0.95 
Canada  27  0.17  Botswana  19  0.67 
Denmark  18  0.74  Brazil  18  0.79 
Finland  27  0.71  Chile  10  0.76 
France  21  0.55  Colombia  27  0.81 
Germany  27  0.40  Costa Rica  27  0.88 
Greece  26  0.68  C6te D'Ivoire  8  0.94 
Iceland  18  0.83  Dominic.  Rep.  5  0.82 
Ireland  27  0.79  Ecuador  27  0.88 
Italy  27  0.69  El Salvador  27  0.60 
Japan  27  0.10  Guatemala  24  0.32 
Netherlands  27  -0.31  India  24  0.42 
New  Zealand  27  0.58  Indonesia  26  0.50 
Norway  27  0.62  Israel  27  0.72 
Portugal  25  0.81  Jamaica  27  0.80 
Spain  22  0.46  Jordan  23  0.77 
Sweden  27  0.72  Korea  27  0.77 
Switzerland  18  -0.35  Malaysia  27  0.56 
United  Kingdom  27  0.19  Mauritius  26  0.81 
United  States  27  0.01  Mexico  24  0.17 
Morocco  27  0.92 
Pakistan  26  0.85 
Panama  27  0.21 
Paraguay  22  0.77 
Peru  8  0.80 
Philippines  27  0.60 
South Africa  27  0.62 
Sri Lanka  25  0.78 
Taiwan  23  0.71 
Thailand  27  0.44 
Trinidad&T.  21  0.75 
Tunisia  27  0.76 
Turkey  22  0.48 
Uruguay  24  0.87 
Venezuela  27  0.34 
Zimbabwe  20  0.63 
aCorrelation  coefficient  between actual  and fitted  values of changes  in the ratio  of NFA to GDP.  Regres- 
sions for the period 1970-1998  corresponding  to column (1) in Table  5a for industrial  countries, and 
column (5) in Table  5b for developing  countries. 104 *  LANE & MILESI-FERRETTI 
where  tbi is the  ratio  to GDP  of the  balance  of goods,  services,  and  current 
transfers;  ii  +  kgi, is the  nominal  rate of return  on  outstanding  net  foreign 
assets  (nominal  yield  iit plus  capital  gains/losses);  and  y  is  the  rate  of 
change  of GDP  measured  in current  dollars.  Note  that  1 +  y =  (1 + g)(l  + 
e)(1  +  7r*), where  g  is  the  real  GDP  growth  rate,  e  is  the  rate  of  real- 
exchange-rate  appreciation  of  the  home  country's  currency  vis-a-vis  the 
U.S.  dollar,  and  7T*  is  U.S.  inflation. 
In  turn,  we  can  rearrange  equation  (6)  to  relate  the  transfer-corrected 
trade  balance  to our  estimate  of the  change  in the  NFA  position,  given  in 






tbi  +  trk =  bit 
- 
(1  tgit  b  +  vi  =  bi-  it  +  Vit  (7)  ii 
(1  +  ,it)(i +  -it() 
where  rit is the  real  rate  of return  on  net  foreign  assets,  measured  in U.S. 
dollars.33  The  transfer-corrected  trade  balance  is  related  to  three  factors. 
The  first  term  on  the  RHS  on  this  equation  reflects  the  change  in  the  net 
foreign-asset  position  that  is  required  for  convergence  to  its  long-run 
fundamental  value,  as  captured  by  the  ECM  representation  in  Section 
4.1;  the  second  term  (-tit)  is  the  combined  effect  of  overall  returns, 
output  growth,  and  real-exchange-rate  changes,  interacted  with  the  past 
NFA  position;  and  the  third  term  is the  component  of the  change  in NFA 
that  is  not  explained  by  the  dynamics  of  its  long-run  fundamentals. 
Consider  for example  a debtor  country  for which  the  rate  of return  on  its 
net  liabilities  is higher  than  its  growth  rate.  In this  case,  if the  fundamen- 
tal  NFA  position  does  not  change,  the  country  will  need  to  run  a trade 
surplus  equal  to  iit. 
In  Figure  9 we  show  the  distribution  of  adjusted  returns  tit  and  the 
trade  balance  tb* among  industrial  and  developing  countries  for the  peri- 
ods  1980-1989  and  1990-1998.34  The  low  growth  and  real  depreciation 
33. In the presence  of differences  in rates of return between  external assets  and liabilities, 
the  RHS would  also include  the  term (rL  -  r)  -l,  where  rt -  rA is the  rate of return 
differential  between  liabilities  and  assets,  and  4_i  is the  stock of gross  liabilities.  We 
implicitly  include  this term in the adjusted  returns  /it. 
34. The construction  of the  adjusted  returns term  tit  is complicated  by the measurement 
problems  associated  with  capital  gains  and losses,  briefly  discussed  in Section  2. For 
industrial  countries,  the series  for KGit  includes  the difference  between  the change  in 
the outstanding  stock and the flow for portfolio  equity investment  assets and liabilities, 
foreign  direct investment  assets  and  liabilities,  and foreign-exchange  reserves.  These 
differences  are particularly  significant  for portfolio  equity  assets  and  liabilities,  espe- 
cially during the 1990s, because  of the fluctuations  in market values  generated by stock- 
market  trends  and  volatility.  Our  data do  not  allow  us  to estimate  capital  gains  and 
losses  on the debt portfolio of industrial countries.  For developing  countries,  the series 
on capital gains and losses  includes  one  additional  item-the  impact of cross-currency 
fluctuations  on the outstanding  stock of gross  external debt  (data that are reported  in 
the World Bank's Global Development  Finance database). Figure 9 TRADE BALANCE AND  ADJUSTED RETURNS: CROSS-COUNTRY DISPERSION, 1980s AND  1990s 
AR<-3%  -10<AR<-3%  -1 <AR<O  O<AR<  l  1 1o<AR<30%  AR>3% 
Adjusted  returns,  developing  countries 
AR<-3%  -1%%<AR<-3 -1%<AR  O <1AR<%  1%<AR<3%  AR>3% 
Trade  balance,  industrial  countries 
TB<-2  -1/%<TB<-2% -1  <TB<  CT<1%  <1%r<TB<2%  TB>2?4 










TB<-3%  -1  %<TB<-3%  -1/o<TB<O  O<TB<1%  1  %<TB<3%  TB>3% 
m 1980-89  1990-981 
Note: Number  of countries  with  adjusted  returns and trade balance  (ratios of GDP),  averaged  over the corresponding  time period,  within  the 
given  range. 
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associated  with  the  debt crisis are reflected  in the  large number  of less 
developed  countries  with  large  negative  adjusted  returns  during  the 
1980s, a number  that declines  in the  1990s. Among  industrial  countries 
one observes  an increase  in the number  of countries  with large negative 
adjusted  returns during  the  1990s, and  correspondingly  in the number 
of countries  running  large  trade surpluses.  The increase  in rates of re- 
turn generated  by the capital gains on equity  holdings  during  the 1990s 
is  one  factor  behind  this  development.  Figure  9  also  highlights  that 
there  is more  dispersion  in  the  trade balance  among  developing  than 
among  industrial  countries. 
Figure 10 presents  scatter diagrams illustrating the cross-sectional  rela- 
tion  between  the  adjusted-returns  term  and  the  trade  balance  for the 
industrial  and  developing  countries  for  the  period  1980-1998.  The 
graphs  also  show  a line with  a negative  slope  of 45 degrees  that corre- 
sponds,  for a given  level  of adjusted  returns,  to the  trade balance  that 
would  keep  the  NFA position  constant  (in the  absence  of capital trans- 
fers such as debt forgiveness).  In both samples  there is a strong negative 
relationship  between  adjusted returns and trade balance.  Some observa- 
tions  are noteworthy.  First, the United  States's  adjusted-returns  term is 
positive,  a reflection of the positive  rate-of-return differential between  its 
external  assets  and liabilities.  This implies  that a trade deficit of 0.5% of 
GDP over  the  past  2 decades  would  have  been  consistent  with  an un- 
changed  NFA position.  In fact the trade deficit has been  much  larger, in 
connection  with  the deterioration  of the U.S.  net external position.  Sec- 
ond,  Singapore's  spectacular  increase  in  its NFA,  even  given  its  large 
positive  adjusted-returns  term, has required large trade surpluses. 
In summary,  the results  in this section  show  that the long-run  funda- 
mentals  driving the NFA positions  can also explain an important fraction 
of short-run changes  in countries'  external wealth,  and that the behavior 
of the  trade balance  is tightly  related  to the dynamics  of the NFA posi- 
tion. The extent to which  changes  in the underlying  fundamentals  of the 
net external position  and correction in any drift from the long-run equilib- 
rium relation are reflected  in the trade balance depends  on the adjusted 
returns on the outstanding  NFA position. 
5. Net Foreign  Assets  and  Real  Interest  Differentials 
Rates of return on assets  and liabilities play a crucial role in determining 
the  dynamic  behavior  of NFA and  are likely  to be  influenced  by  their 
level and composition.  For instance,  a home bias in asset demand  and/or 
an  upward-sloping  supply  of  international  funds  means  that  interest 
rates may  be linked  to NFA positions:  debtor  countries  should  experi- Long-Term  Capital  Movements * 107 
Figure 10 ADJUSTED RETURNS AND  THE TRADE BALANCE 
Industrial  countries 
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ence  higher  interest  rates  than  creditor  countries.  Applications  of  this 
portfolio  balance  approach have typically related currency returns to shifts 
in relative  asset  supplies  in different  currencies  (e.g.  a model  of dollar 
interest  rates  vs.  yen  interest  rates),  but  the  model  should  hold  more 
generally  as a framework  for thinking  about  country  risk (Frankel and 
Rose,  1995). 
In this spirit, the real interest-rate differential  can be written  as 
it -  rwt =  it  -  Et[ARERt+l]  (8) 
where  it  is the country  risk premium  and the second  term on the right- 
hand side is (minus) the expected  rate of real exchange-rate  appreciation. 
If the rate of real appreciation  is zero in a steady  state,  then  the long- 




rw, =  bit  =  -  bxit,  8 >  0,  (9) 
where  we  model  the  country  risk premium  as inversely  (and  linearly) 
related to the ratio of NFA to exports,  bxit.35 
5.1 EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
We confine  attention  to the industrial-country  sample.  Nominal  interest 
rates  are  yields  on  government  bonds,  the  same  ones  employed  by 
Obstfeld  and Rogoff  (2000, 2001).36  We measure  the real interest  rate as 
the  December  nominal  interest  rate in year t minus  the  actual inflation 
rate in year t +  1. 
We report the  panel  fixed-effects  results  in Table 7, where  the DOLS 
estimator  is again employed.  In panel  (a), we  include  all countries,  and 
the time dummies  soak up the world  real interest rate that is common  to 
all countries;  in panel  (a), we  employ  the real interest  differential  vis-a- 
vis the U.S. The actual ratio of NFA to exports is employed  as a regressor 
in columns  (1)-(4),  whereas  in columns  (5)-(8)  we  use  the fitted values 
generated  in Section  3.3.2.37 The results  in columns  (1)-(2)  and  (5)-(6) 
are for 1970-1998;  those  in columns  (3)-(4)  and  (7)-(8),  for 1980-1998. 
We also enter the stock of public  debt and the rate of real exchange-rate 
35. We use exports rather  than GDP as the denominator  to better capture  the capacity  of 
the economy to make overseas payments. The choice of denominator makes little 
practical  difference  for the results. 
36. Iceland  is excluded from the sample. We thank those authors and Jay  Shambaugh  for 
generous assistance  with these data. 
37. In Section 3.3.2, we regressed the ratio of NFA to GDP on output per capita,  the stock 
of public debt, and demographic  variables. We multiply the fitted values from this 
regression  by the ratio  of GDP to exports. Long-Term  Capital  Movements * 109 
appreciation  in  alternative  specifications.38  In  line  with  the  portfolio- 
balance  literature,  the former is intended  to control  for variation in the 
supply  of alternative assets; the latter is to proxy for expected  changes  in 
the real exchange  rate. 
Across columns  (1)-(8),  the results  show  clear evidence  of a portfolio- 
balance  effect  in  the  determination  of real interest  differentials:  for in- 
stance,  according  to  the  point  estimate  in  column  (1) of  panel  (b),  a 
20-percentage-point  improvement  in the ratio of NFA to exports is associ- 
ated with  a 50-basis-point  reduction  in the real interest-rate differential. 
The effect is also significant  for the 1980-1998  period,  and the estimated 
point  coefficient  is  typically  larger  for  the  more  recent  period.  These 
findings  are little affected by inclusion  of the stock of public debt and the 
rate  of  real  exchange-rate  appreciation.  Even  stronger  results  are ob- 
tained  when  the NFA position  is instrumented  by the level  of GDP per 
capita, public  debt,  and demographic  variables  in columns  (5)-(8),  sug- 
gesting  that  the  relation  is  not  being  generated  by  reverse  causality 
running  from the real interest-differential  on the NFA position. 
Figure 11 provides  a scatterplot  of average net foreign assets  and real 
interest  rates over  the  period  1990-1998,  documenting  a negative  rela- 
tion  between  these  variables.  Table 8 reports  cross-section  regression 
results  for the same period.  In the cross section,  net foreign assets  again 
have  a significant  effect  on  the  real interest-rate  differential  across  all 
specifications.  For instance,  the point  estimate  of -1.07  in column  (1) of 
panel (b) indicates  that, all else equal, a country with an average NFA-to- 
exports ratio that is 50 percentage  points  above  the sample  mean enjoys 
a  real  interest  rate  that  is  53.5  basis  points  below  the  average  real 
interest-rate differential  vis-a-vis  the U.S.  We note  also that the stock of 
public  debt  typically  has  a marginally  significant  positive  effect  on  the 
real interest-rate  differential  (at the  10% level),  but  real exchange-rate 
appreciation  has no effect in the cross-sectional  specification. 
The results in this section provide  some  suggestive  evidence  that NFA 
positions  matter  in  determining  real  interest-rate  differentials,  in  the 
spirit  of  the  portfolio-balance  literautre.39 In future  work,  it would  be 
38. In  line  with  the  method  for  measuring  expected  inflation,  the  actual  rate  of  real 
exchange-rate  appreciation  in year t+ 1 proxies for the expected  rate of real appreciation 
in year t + 1. In panel  (a), we  use  a multivariate  CPI-based real-exchange-rate  series; in 
panel  (b), the bilateral CPI-based real exchange  rate vis-a-vis  the U.S. 
39. Bayoumi and Gagnon  (1996) predict that a country's NFA position  should be negatively 
correlated with its (after-tax) real interest rate. In this case,  our estimate of the portfolio 
balance effect will be understated  if a high real interest rate endogenously  improves  the 
NFA  position.  We  further  note  that  inflation  and  real  interest  rates  are  negatively 
correlated  in the  time-series  dimension  of our dataset  but positively  correlated  in the 
cross section. r 




Table 7  REAL INTEREST RATES AND  REAL INTEREST DIFFERENTIALS:  PANEL DOLS REGRESSIONS WITH 
FIXED TIME AND  COUNTRY EFFECTS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
1970-98  1970-98  1980-98  1980-98  1970-98  1970-98  1980-98  1980-98 
(a) Real Interest Rate 
-1.36  -0.91 
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Countries 
Observations 
(b) Real Interest Differential 
-2.54  -2.44  -2.73  -2.22  -2.57  -2.77  -3.19  -3.24 









































Sample is industrial countries  except Iceland. In panel  (a), the dependent  variable is the real interest rate; in panel  (b), the real interest differential vis-a-vis  the 
United States.  In regressions  (1)-(4),  CUMCA is employed  as the measure  of NFA; in regressions  (5)-(8),  it is based  on the fitted value  from the regression  of 
NFA on GDP per capita, public debt,  and demographic  variables.  In regressions  (2), (4), (6), and (8), the multivariate  real exchange  rate is employed  in panel 
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instructive  to experiment  with  different asset classes  and maturities  and 
explore  alternative  techniques  for calculating  expected  inflation  and the 
expected  rate of real appreciation.  Moreover,  it would  be interesting  to 
distinguish  between  different components  of the NFA position  (e.g.,  is it 
just net external debt that matters? do portfolio  equity liabilities and FDI 
liabilities  have  different  effects?)  and  to  investigate  the  interaction  be- 
tween  NFA positions  and other risk factors in determining  real interest- 
rate differentials. 
6.  Conclusions 
Our primary goal in this paper has been  to demonstrate  the fruitfulness 
of studying  the behavior  of a key  state variable in international  macro- 
economics:  namely,  the net foreign-asset  position.  We have  shown  that 
persistent  fundamentals-output  per  capita,  public  debt,  and  demo- 
graphic  variables-have  a major influence  on  the  direction  of interna- 
tional  asset  trade.  Moreover,  we  have  examined  the role played  by the 
desired  and actual NFA position  in determining  the trade balance-the 
former  because  trade  balances  are  typically  required  to  accomplish 
changes  in the target NFA position,  the latter due  to the role played  by Long-Term  Capital  Movements  * 113 
Table  8  REAL  INTEREST  RATES  AND REAL  INTEREST  DIFFERENTIAL: 
CROSS-SECTION  EVIDENCE  (AVERAGE,  1990-98) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(a) Real Interest Rate 
NFA/exports  -0.88  -0.88  -1.2  -1.18 
(2.6)*  (2.68)*  (5.39)**  (5.28)** 
Public debt  1.57  1.31 
(1.55)  (1.67) 
D(RER)  -0.19  -0.19 
(0.9)  (1.1) 
Adjusted  R2  0.31  0.35  0.49  0.52 
Countries  21  21  21  21 
(b) Real Interest Differential 
NFA/exports  -1.07  -1.07  -1.27  -1.26 
(3.62)**  (4.12)**  (6.61)**  (8.21)** 
Public  debt  1.72  1.33 
(1.8)  (1.7) 
D(RER)  -0.08  -0.1 
(.43)  (.72) 
Adjusted R2  0.54  0.59  0.65  0.68 
Countries  20  20  20  20 
Sample  is industrial  countries,  except  Iceland.  1990-1998  averaged  data.  In panel  (a), the  dependent 
variable is the real interest rate; in panel  (b) the real interest differential vis-a-vis  the U.S.  In regressions 
(1)-(2),  CUMCA is employed  as the measure of NFA; in regressions  (3)-(4)  it is based on the fitted value 
from regression  of NFA on GDP per capita, public debt,  and demographic  variables.  In regressions  (2) 
and (4), the multivariate real exchange  rate is employed  in panel (a), and the bivariate real exchange  rate 
vis-a-vis  the  U.S.  in panel  (b). * (**) indicates  statistical  significance  at the  5% (1%) confidence  level. 
investment  returns on outstanding  foreign  assets  and liabilities.  Finally, 
we  have  presented  evidence  that the NFA position  is also important  in 
determining  international  asset  prices,  exerting  a negative  influence  on 
real interest-rate differentials. 
Given the space limitations,  there are many interesting  questions  con- 
cerning  foreign-asset  and  -liability positions  that we  cannot  address  in 
this paper.  In other work,  we  have  shown  that NFA positions  exert an 
important  influence  on  the  long-run  behavior  of  real  exchange  rates 
(Lane and  Milesi-Ferretti,  2000) and  made  an initial  exploration  of the 
determinants  of  the  structure  of  the  "international  balance  sheet"  be- 
tween  debt,  portfolio  equity,  and  foreign  direct  investment  (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti,  2001b). Among  the important  issues  that we  must  defer 
to future research is the role played  by the level  and composition  of the 
external balance sheet  in determining  the probability of a financial crisis, 114 *  LANE  & MILESI-FERRETTI 
and  an exploration  of the  factors driving  differences  in cross-countries 
rates of return on external assets  and liabilities. 
Appendix 
Our demographic  specification  follows  Fair and  Dominguez  (1991) and 
Higgins  (1998). We divide  the population  into J = 12 age cohorts,  and the 
age variables enter the net-foreign-assets  equation  as Ej2  ajpjt, where Pjt  is 
the population  share of cohort j in period  t and aSj2  = 0. We make the 
restriction that the coefficients  lie along a cubic polynomial 
aj =  yo +  yij  +  Y2j2 +  Y3j3. 
The zero-sum  restriction on the coefficients  implies  that 
1  12  1  12  1  12 
Y/0  -  1  E  j -  7Y2  2  j2-  3 - E  j3 
J  j=l  J  j=1  J  j=1 
In turn,  we  can estimate  y7,  y2,73  by  introducing  the age variables  into 
the estimated  equation  in the following  way: 
y7 DEM1,  +  y2 DEM2t +  y3 DEM3t, 
where 
12  1  12  12 
DEMlt  = E  jP,t -  -  j  E  Pjt, 
j=l  J j=1  j=1 
12  1  12  12 
DEM2t = E  j2  pjt -  j2  Pjt, 
j=1  J  j=1  j=1 
12  1  12  12 
DEM3t  =  E  j3 pjt 
-  3  j 
3 
Pjt 
j=1  J j=1  j=1 
Finally, we  can easily recover the implicit aj once we  know  yo, y,  y2,  73. 
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1.  Overview  of the  Paper 
This  paper  is  part  of  an  ambitious  project  by  Lane  and  Milesi-Ferretti 
attempting  to  measure,  explain,  and  explore  various  aspects  of  interna- 
tional  balance  sheets.  The  first  paper  in  the  series,  "The  External  Wealth 
of  Nations,"  documents  the  compilation  of  an  exciting  new  dataset  on 
net  foreign-asset  positions  for  a sample  of  66  industrial  and  developing 
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KRISTIN J. FORBES 
MIT-Sloan  School and NBER 
1.  Overview  of the  Paper 
This  paper  is  part  of  an  ambitious  project  by  Lane  and  Milesi-Ferretti 
attempting  to  measure,  explain,  and  explore  various  aspects  of  interna- 
tional  balance  sheets.  The  first  paper  in  the  series,  "The  External  Wealth 
of  Nations,"  documents  the  compilation  of  an  exciting  new  dataset  on 
net  foreign-asset  positions  for  a sample  of  66  industrial  and  developing Comment  117 
countries from 1970 through  1998. This paper uses this dataset to answer 
three straightforward  questions.  First, what determines  a country's  NFA 
position?  Second,  how  do changes  in a country's  net foreign-asset  posi- 
tion affect its trade balance? Third and finally, how  does a country's  NFA 
position  affect its domestic  interest rate? 
The paper  presents  an extensive  series  of graphs  and empirical tests 
aimed at answering  these  three questions.  Most of the results are highly 
significant,  economically  important,  and in agreement  with  the predic- 
tions of standard  open-economy  macro models.  For example,  results for 
the  first question  suggest  that in industrial  countries,  changes  in NFA 
positions  are positively  correlated with  changes  in output  per capita. In 
developing  countries,  changes  in net  foreign-asset  positions  are nega- 
tively  correlated with changes  in output  per capita and negatively  corre- 
lated with changes  in public debt. In both groups  of countries,  NFA posi- 
tions are highly  correlated with demographics.  The results for the second 
question  show  that countries'  net foreign-asset  positions  are negatively 
correlated with  their trade balance.  Finally, results for the third question 
indicate that countries' NFA positions  are negatively  correlated with their 
real interest  rates. 
The authors should  be applauded  for this paper. They examine impor- 
tant  questions  that  are far from  resolved  in  the  open-economy  macro 
literature.  In their empirical  tests,  they  are careful to use  panel  estima- 
tion  to control  for any  time-invariant  omitted  variables,  as well  as the 
appropriate  time-series  techniques  to adjust  for cointegration.  Despite 
their  extremely  parsimonious  specifications,  the  graphs  of  actual  and 
fitted values  suggest  that their models  have a high degree of explanatory 
power  for most  countries  in the sample.  Perhaps most  noteworthy,  the 
dataset compiled  for this paper was  a substantial  undertaking  (which  is 
understated  in  the  paper)  and  will  undoubtedly  form  the  basis  of  a 
numerous  studies  examining  topics related to net foreign assets. 
I do,  however,  have  several  concerns  with  the  paper's  analysis.  To 
correspond  to the trio of questions  examined  in the paper, the remainder 
of  my  comments  will  focus  on  three  of  the  most  problematic  issues: 
nonlinearity,  omitted  variables,  and  endogeneity.  The  comments  will 
conclude  with  an overall evaluation  of the paper. 
2.  Nonlinearity  and  Income  Divisions 
My first set of concerns  with  the paper is that many  of the relationships 
being  tested with linear regressions  are nonlinear.  This problem arises in 
each of the three sets  of tests,  but to make the point  clearly, I will focus 
on  one  specific  nonlinearity:  the relationship  between  a country's  GDP 
per capita and its NFA position.  In the theoretical  discussion  in Section 118 *  FORBES 
3.1,  the  paper  points  out  several  ways  in which  output  per capita can 
affect net foreign-asset  positions.  For example,  "if the domestic  marginal 
product  of capital  decreases  as an economy  grows  richer, domestic  in- 
vestment  will fall and home  investors  will seek  out overseas  accumula- 
tion opportunities."  On the other hand,  in credit-constrained  countries, 
"an increase in production  may allow  greater recourse  to foreign  credit, 
possibly  implying  a negative  relation  between  net  external  assets  and 
relative  output  per capita, at least over some  interval." 
Each  of  these  channels  linking  a country's  output  and  net  foreign- 
asset  position  could  counteract  each  other,  and  the  relative  strength  of 
each of the channels  could vary with a country's  income level.  For exam- 
ple,  the  second  channel,  based  on  credit  constraints,  is more  likely  to 
occur in developing  countries.  In order to adjust for this nonlinear  rela- 
tionship  between  output  and net foreign  assets,  the authors divide  their 
sample  into  two  groups  of countries:  industrial  and  developing.  They 
define  industrial  countries  as  "long-standing  members  of  the  OECD, 
which  approximately  corresponds  to  the  most-developed  set  of  coun- 
tries at the start of the sample  period." 
The empirical results for the two groups  of countries  suggest  that this 
relationship  between  output  and net  foreign  assets  is in fact nonlinear 
and driven by the two theoretical channels  discussed  above. The relation- 
ship  between  changes  in output  per capita and  changes  in net  foreign 
assets  is positive  and highly  significant in industrial countries,  and nega- 
tive  and  highly  significant  in  developing  countries.  But  is  there  any 
reason to believe  that this rough  division  between  "long-standing  mem- 
bers of the OECD" and nonmembers  accurately captures the true form of 
the relationship? Each group of countries is extremely  diverse.  For exam- 
ple,  "industrial" countries  include  the  U.S.  and  Switzerland  as well  as 
Greece and Portugal. "Developing"  countries include  Paraguay and Zim- 
babwe  as well  as Singapore  and Israel. It is hard to believe  the relation- 
ship between  income  and net foreign assets is the same for these  diverse 
members  of each country  group. 
A simple  extension  to one of the figures in the paper shows  that these 
differences  within  each  group  of countries  in the  relationship  between 
income  and net  foreign  assets  can be important  and significantly  affect 
estimates.  Figure 1 graphs  the average  change  in a country's  NFA posi- 
tion  between  1980-1989  and  1990-1998  vs.  the  average  change  in  its 
GDP per capita over the same two periods  for developing  countries.  This 
is the analysis  performed  in Figure 4(b) of the paper.1 Then,  to calculate 
1. Figure 4(b) drops  several  observations  from the sample  because  those  countries  do not 
have  sufficient  data to include  in the  subsequent  regression  analysis.  I include  the  full 
sample,  with no significant  effect on the results. Comment ?  119 
Figure 1 DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
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the fitted line for the graph, I estimate the linear specification  used  in the 
paper  and  also  add  a squared  term for GDP per capita.  Regression  re- 
sults are reported in columns  (1) and (2) of Table 1. The nonlinear  specifi- 
cation outperforms  the linear regression,  and the squared term is highly 
significant.  In Figure 1, the fitted regression  line including  the nonlinear 
term is clearly a better fit for the data than a straight line. 
Next,  instead  of focusing  on just  developing  countries,  I repeat  this 
analysis  for the entire sample  of countries.  Figure 2 graphs the relation- 
ship between  average changes  in NFA positions  and average  changes  in 
GDP per capita for industrial and developing  countries.  Columns  (3) and 
(4) in  Table 1 report regression  estimates  for the  linear  regression  and 
with  the  additional  squared  term,  respectively.  Once  again,  the nonlin- 
ear specification  outperforms  the linear specification,  and Figure 2 sug- 
gests  that  the  nonlinear  fitted  line  is  a much  better  description  of  the 
data. 
This series of results  suggests  that the underlying  relationship  linking 
changes  in  NFA positions  and  GDP per  capita  is not  linear.  A  simple 
extension  to the panel  estimates-just  adding  a squared term-appears 
to significantly  improve  the  specification.  In the  current version  of the 
paper,  the  authors  perform  a  similar  extension  to  their  cross-section 
estimates  [adding  a squared  term for GDP per  capita in column  (6) of 120 *  FORBES 
Table 1  EVIDENCE OF NONLINEARITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN INCOME PER CAPITA AND  NET FOREIGN ASSETS 
Developing 
countries 
(1)  (2) 
Full 
sample 
(3)  (4) 
Constant  -0.05  -0.05  -0.06  -0.09 
(-0.80)  (-0.86)  (-1.46)  (-2.07) 
Log GDP  0.62  1.62  0.66  1.41 
per capita  (3.15)  (4.30)  (4.09)  (4.68) 
Log GDP  -2.04  -1.55 
per capita2  (-3.01)  (-2.89) 
No.  of countries  45  45  67  67 
Adjusted  R2  0.17  0.30  0.19  0.27 
Note:  t-statistics  are in parentheses. Variables  calculated  as average changes between 1980-1989  and 
1990-1998  (to correspond  to Figure  4 in the paper).  See Figures  1 and 2 of this comment  for  correspond- 
ing data points and fitted  regression  line. 
Figure 2 ALL COUNTRIES 
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Table 4].  The  nonlinear  term  is  highly  significant,  and  including  this 
term  substantially  affects  other  coefficient  estimates.  This combination 
of results  suggests  that the rough division  between  industrial and devel- 
oping countries used in the paper will not accurately capture the relation- 
ship  between  income  levels  and  NFA positions.  Instead  of using  these 
two rough groups,  the paper should  try to better specify  the underlying, 
nonlinear  relationship  between  these  variables.  At  the  very  least,  it 
should  include  a squared term in the base specification.  As shown  in the 
simple  tests in Table 1, even  the simple  extension  of including  a squared 
term for income  levels  can significantly  affect coefficient  estimates. 
3.  Omitted  Variables:  Investment,  at Least 
A second  concern  that I have  with  this paper  is omitted  variables.  The 
specifications  estimated  to  answer  each  of  the  three  motivating  ques- 
tions are extremely  parsimonious.  For example,  the first series of regres- 
sions,  predicting  determinants  of a country's NFA position,  include  only 
six  control  variables:  income  per  capita,  public  debt,  and  three  demo- 
graphic  variables.  The second  series  of regressions,  predicting  a coun- 
try's trade balance,  include  two  sets  of explanatory  variables: a lagged 
measure  of the  trade balance  and  then  a set  of controls  for investment 
returns.  The third series  of regressions,  predicting  real interest-rate dif- 
ferentials,  includes  at most three controls: NFA, public debt, and the real 
exchange  rate. 
In all three cases,  there are numerous  variables  that are not included 
in the regression  but could  affect the dependent  variable and be highly 
correlated  with  one  or more  explanatory  variables.  As  a result,  coeffi- 
cient  estimates  could  be biased.  The paper  takes  an important  step  to- 
ward adjusting  for omitted-variables  bias by using  panel estimation  and 
controlling  for any time-invariant  country-specific  effects.  Panel estima- 
tion does  not,  however,  control for any omitted  variables that vary over 
time,  which  is particularly problematic in this paper, since the time peri- 
ods are fairly long (generally 28 or 18 years). To make this point about the 
necessity  to include  additional  controls and sensitivity  tests in the regres- 
sion analysis,  I will focus on one omitted  variable: domestic  investment. 
This is only  one  example  of several  omitted  variables  that could  signifi- 
cantly affect the regression  results. 
Domestic  investment  is one  variable that should  be  included  in esti- 
mates predicting  a country's  NFA position  (the first series of tests in the 
paper). To see  the importance  of this variable, it is useful  to examine  the 
standard balance-of-payments  accounting  equation  used  in introductory 
macroeconomics  textbooks: 122 *  FORBES 
Xit -  Mit =  (TAit -  Git -  TRt) +Sit  -  lit, 
,  -  j  (1) 
trade surplus  govt.  budget  surplus 
where  X is exports,  M is imports,  TA is government  tax revenue,  G is 
government  spending  on goods  and services,  TR is government  transfer 
payments,  S is private savings,  and I is domestic  investment.  The model 
used  to estimate  a country's  NFA position  in the paper is 
NFAit = GDEBTit  + DEMit + YCit,  (2) 
where  NFA is the  ratio of net  foreign  assets  to GDP, YC is output  per 
capita,  GDEBT is the  stock  of public  debt,  and  DEM is a set  of demo- 
graphic variables.  When  equation  (2) is estimated  in changes  (as in the 
panel  specification),  it is directly comparable to equation  (1). Changes  in 
NFA in equation  (2) are highly  correlated with the trade surplus  in equa- 
tion (2) (as explored  in detail in the second  series  of tests  in the paper.) 
Changes  in  GDEBT in  equation  (2) are equivalent  to  the  government 
budget  surplus  in equation  (1). Changes  in DEM are included  to capture 
how changes in the demographic  composition  of the population  affect the 
savings  rate [as written  in equation  (1)]. Investment,  however  [the final 
term in equation  (1)], is not included  in equation  (2). Instead,  the paper 
includes  output  per capita. 
It is  well  documented  that  investment  is  highly  volatile  over  time 
within  a given  country.  Therefore,  it is unlikely  that the  country  fixed 
effects  control  for movements  in this variable.  Moreover,  investment  is 
undoubtedly  correlated with  output  per capita. Therefore,  do estimates 
of the  relationship  between  output  per capita and NFA in equation  (2) 
capture  the  relationship  between  these  two  variables?  Or is the  coeffi- 
cient on output per capita actually capturing the effect of investment?  Or 
is the relationship  between  investment  and GDP biasing  the coefficient 
estimates  on GDP? 
To analyze these questions  more formally, Table 2 reports the univariate 
correlations  between  NFA  (measured  by  CUMCA),  income  per capita, 
and  investment  as a share  of GDP for industrial  and developing  coun- 
tries.2 These univariate correlations suggest  that NFA are positively  corre- 
lated with  GDP per capita in both  industrial  and developing  countries. 
This is in contrast to the multivariate panel regression  results, where NFA 
are positively  correlated with GDP per capita in industrial countries,  but 
negatively  correlated in developing  countries.  The univariate correlation 
2. Correlations  are calculated  across countries  and years.  Investment  as a share of GDP is 
taken  from World Bank (2000).  World  Development Indicators  on CD-ROM, Washington, 
DC: World Bank. Comment  123 
Table  2  UNIVARIATE  CORRELATIONS 
(a) Industrial countries:  1970-1998 
NFA  GDP per  Investment 
(CUMCA)  capita  /GDP 
NFA (CUMCA)  1.00  0.45  0.04 
GDP per capita  1.00  -0.17 
Investment/GDP  1.00 
(b) Developing countries:  1970-1998 
NFA  GDP per  Investment 
(CUMCA)  capita  /GDP 
NFA (CUMCA)  1.00  0.37  -0.04 
GDP per capita  1.00  0.07 
Investment/GDP  1.00 
estimates  also show  that NFA are positively  correlated with investment  in 
industrial  countries  and  negatively  correlated  in developing  countries. 
Moreover,  GDP  per  capita  is negatively  correlated  with  investment  in 
industrial  countries  and positively  correlated in developing  countries. 
Although  it is impossible  to predict how  omitting  investment  will bias 
the coefficient  on GDP per capita in the multivariate  context of equation 
(2), the correlations in Table 2 allow us to predict the bias in a univariate 
context.  The correlations  suggest  that omitting  investment  will generate 
a negative  bias in estimates  of the effect of GDP on NFA in both indus- 
trial and developing  countries.  Moreover, if these  univariate correlations 
are strong enough  and outweigh  any counteracting  multivariate correla- 
tions,  that  will  also  be  the  effect  of  the  omitted-variable  bias  in  the 
multivariate context. 
Table 3 tests  these  implications.  It reports  fixed-effects  estimates  of 
equation  (2) with  and without  a control  for investment  for both  indus- 
trial and  developing  countries.3 The results  agree  with  the  predictions 
from the univariate  correlation analysis.  Excluding  investment  from the 
model  generates  a downward  bias on the coefficient  estimates  for GDP 
per  capita.  In  industrial  countries,  the  effect  of  the  bias  is  small.  In 
developing  countries,  however,  the  effect  of the bias is significant  and 
the coefficient on GDP per capita becomes  insignificant,  while  the coeffi- 
cient on investment  is negative  and highly  significant.  This suggests  that 
3. These estimates  are similar to those reported in column  (1) of Tables 2 and 3 in the paper. 
The only  differences  between  these  estimates  and those  in the paper  (to the best of my 
knowledge)  are: (1) these  estimates  are fixed effects and do not control for cointegration 
as done  in the paper; (2) this sample  size  is slightly  larger than that in the paper. 124 *  FORBES 
Table  3  REGRESSION  RESULTS:  IMPACT  OF OMITTING  INVESTMENT 
FROM  PREDICTIONS  OF NET FOREIGN  ASSETS 
Industrial  Developing 
countries  countries 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Log GDP  0.87  0.93  -0.19  -0.04 
per capita  (14.73)  (15.02)  (-4.57)  (-0.88) 
Public  debt  -0.13  -0.17  -0.63  -0.63 
/GDP  (-4.10)  (-5.20)  (-19.27)  (-19.84) 
Investment  -0.47  -1.16 
/GDP  (-2.97)  (-8.49) 
No. of observations  577  535  907  872 
No. of countries  22  22  39  38 
Within R2  0.46  0.51  0.47  0.54 
Note:  t-statistics  are in parentheses.  Dependent variable  is CUMCA.  Estimates  are fixed effects for the 
full sample  from  1970-1998.  Period  dummies  and demographic  variables  are  included  in the regressions 
but are not reported. 
when  investment  is omitted  from the equation,  estimates  of the effect of 
GDP  per  capita  on  NFA  in  developing  countries  may  be  biased  and 
actually be capturing  the relationship  between  investment  and NFA. 
This section has presented  theoretical and empirical evidence  that omit- 
ting one variable from one  regression  could  significantly  bias coefficient 
estimates.  Domestic  investment  in the regressions  predicting  NFA, how- 
ever, is only one of a number of potentially  important omitted  variables. 
Others  are capital-account  liberalization,  increased  trade flows,  changes 
in  expected  growth  rates  or returns,  income  inequality,  inflation,  and 
exchange-rate  movements.  Each of these  variables has  changed  signifi- 
cantly  for many  countries  in  the  sample  over  the  long  periods  under 
consideration  and therefore will not be captured in the country effects in 
the panel  estimation.  Granted,  there  are limited  degrees  of freedom  in 
many of the regressions  estimated  in the paper, but given  the potentially 
serious biases from excluding  these important variables, the paper should 
carefully  address  what  other variables  are omitted  and how  they  might 
affect the results.  Moreover,  the paper should  add an extensive  series of 
sensitivity  tests  to  see  if including  any  of  these  variables  in  the  base 
specification  significantly  affects  results.  The NBER Macroeconomics  An- 
nual is the ideal forum to perform this sort of detailed robustness  analysis 
and  explore  a wide  variety  of potential  interactions  between  variables. Comment 125 
4.  Endogeneity:  What  is Actually  Driving  What? 
The third major concern  that I have  with  this paper is endogeneity.  The 
paper  carefully  explains  why  each  of the  independent  variables  could 
affect the  dependent  variables  in each  of the  three  sets  of regressions. 
There are equally  valid  reasons,  however,  why  each  of the  dependent 
variables  could  in turn affect many  of the explanatory  variables.  In sev- 
eral parts of the paper, the language  suggests  that the authors are aware 
of this  problem.  For example,  when  interpreting  coefficient  estimates, 
they  write  that a movement  in one  variable  "is associated  with"  or "is 
correlated with" a movement  in another variable, instead  of saying  that 
a movement  in one variable "causes" a movement  in the other. In other 
cases,  however,  the  terminology  is less  careful and  the  language  inter- 
prets  coefficient  estimates  as  showing  causality.  Moreover,  the  central 
purposes  motivating  the  paper  are not  to understand  correlations,  but 
rather  to  better  understand  what  causes  changes  in  a country's  NFA 
position  and what  are the effects  of changes  in NFA positions  on other 
variables,  such as the trade balance and interest-rate differentials.  There- 
fore,  in  order  to  answer  the  key  questions  motivating  the  paper,  the 
authors should  address potential  endogeneity  issues  in more detail. This 
section  discusses  two specific examples  in detail and then provides  sug- 
gestions  for dealing  with  endogeneity. 
One  of  the  clearest  examples  of endogeneity  is in the  final series  of 
tests in the paper: how  a country's  NFA position  affects its interest-rate 
differential  (versus the global interest  rate or the U.S.  interest  rate.) The 
paper estimates  a straightforward  regression  of the interest-rate differen- 
tial  on  NFA,  using  both  panel  and  cross-country  estimation  for  two 
different  periods.  In alternative  specifications,  there are also controls for 
movements  in the country's  real exchange  rate and stock of public debt. 
Estimates of the coefficient  on net foreign assets are negative  and usually 
highly  significant.  The  paper  interprets  this  as  "some  suggestive  evi- 
dence  that NFA positions  matter in determining  real interest-rate differ- 
entials.  .  ."  But,  do  movements  in  NFA  positions  drive  movements  in 
the  interest-rate  differential,  or  vice  versa?  Japan is  a  clear  example. 
Japan has  significantly  lowered  its interest  rate since  1990 (from 5.20 in 
1990 to 0.01 in 1998) in an attempt to spur domestic  growth.4 During this 
period,  Japan has  consistently  run a large capital-account  surplus,  and 
its NFA position  has increased  substantially.  (The CUMCA variable rose 
from 0.14 in 1990 to 0.39 in 1998.) Did the change  in Japan's NFA posi- 
tion drive the fall in interest  rates? Or did the fall in interest  rates drive 
the  change  in Japan's NFA position?  The specification  in the  paper  as- 
4. Based on the real-interest-rate data used  in the paper. 126 *  FORBES 
sumes  the  former, while  I would  argue  that the  latter channel  is more 
important. 
In addition  to this model  predicting  interest-rate  differentials,  each of 
the  central  regressions  in  the  paper  could  also  have  problems  with 
endogeneity.  For example,  in the  set  of regressions  predicting  a coun- 
try's  NFA  position,  two  of  the  explanatory  variables  are income  per 
capita and public  debt.  But when  a country borrows  more from abroad 
(generating  a  negative  NFA  position),  couldn't  these  additional  re- 
sources spur output growth-especially  in a country that was previously 
liquidity-constrained?  And if the borrowing  from abroad is largely lend- 
ing  to  the  government,  couldn't  this  decline  in  NFA  (i.e.,  increased 
borrowing  from  abroad)  allow  the  government  to  increase  its  level  of 
public  debt? For example,  in the last 5 years of the dataset,  Argentina's 
NFA (as measured  by CUMCA)  fell from  -18.2%  in 1993 to  -27.8%  in 
1998.  Over  the  same  period,  Argentina's  public  debt  increased  from 
23.8% to 28.4% of GDP. Did the changes  in Argentina's  public debt cause 
the changes  in its NFA position,  or vice versa? 
Each of these  examples  suggests  that endogeneity  could  affect regres- 
sion  estimates.  The authors  should  directly  address  these  issues  rather 
than  using  terms  such  as "associated  with"  or "correlated with"  when 
interpreting  results.  In the theoretical  motivation  for each set of regres- 
sions,  they  should  carefully  discuss  any  channels  that  could  generate 
feedback from the dependent  to the explanatory  variables. In the regres- 
sion  estimates,  they  should  attempt  to  instrument  for  the  variables 
which  are  most  likely  to  suffer  from  serious  endogeneity  problems. 
Granted,  finding  desirable  instruments  is  always  difficult  in  a  panel 
framework,  but  at the  very  least  the  authors  should  try using  lagged 
values  of each of the relevant variables as instruments. 
5.  Conclusions  and  Overall  Assessment 
When  I read  and  assess  an empirical  paper,  I frequently  think  of it in 
terms of a four-tiered  pyramid.  At the base of the pyramid  is the paper's 
motivation.  Without  a relevant  question  or interesting  issue,  a paper has 
no  foundation  and  will  have  minimal  impact.  The  second  tier  on  the 
pyramid is the dataset.  Although  no dataset is perfect, it is impossible  to 
address  certain issues  without  critical pieces  of information  of an accept- 
able quality. The third and fourth tiers of the pyramid  are the model  and 
estimation  methodology.  The  model  should  capture  the  key  relation- 
ships  between  the  relevant  variables,  and  the  estimation  methodology 
should yield unbiased  and efficient estimates.  Few empirical papers satis- 
factorily achieve  all four of these  levels. Comment  127 
The  paper  by  Lane  and  Milesi-Ferretti  performs  well  as assessed  in 
terms  of  this  empirical-paper  pyramid.  The  paper  clearly  satisfies  the 
first criterion: it is built on a strong base.  It asks a number  of important 
questions  about  the  determinants  of  countries'  net  foreign-asset  posi- 
tions  and  how  changes  in  these  asset  positions  affect  key  macro- 
economic  variables.  The paper also performs  extremely  well  on the sec- 
ond  tier of the  pyramid.  It uses  an exciting  new  dataset,  undoubtedly 
compiled  with  a tremendous  amount  of effort by the  authors,  on NFA 
positions.  The paper is weaker,  however,  on the third and fourth tiers of 
the  pyramid.  The  models  used  as  the  basis  for  estimation  may  miss 
important  relationships  between  key  variables.  Although  cointegration 
is an excellent  start, the estimation  methodology  may overlook  substan- 
tial problems.  In particular, my comments  have  focused  on three poten- 
tial problems  with  the model  and estimation:  nonlinearity,  omitted  vari- 
ables, and endogeneity.  To be fair, however,  much of the empirical work 
in macroeconomics  does  not satisfactorily  address  these  three issues. 
Therefore,  although  my  comments  have  focused  on several  potential 
weaknesses  with  the paper,  the paper's  accomplishments  and valuable 
contributions  are worth reiterating. This paper uses  a first-rate new  data- 
set  to investigate  several  important  issues  relating  to international  bal- 
ance  sheets.  Many  of  these  issues  were  previously  unresolved  in  the 
literature,  largely  due  to unsatisfactory  data. In terms  of the empirical- 
paper  pyramid,  the  paper  satisfies  the  two  most  important  criteria to 
form the basis of an important paper-interesting  and unresolved  ques- 
tions combined  with excellent  data. The paper's results will undoubtedly 
inspire  future  work  investigating  a  number  of  these  relationships  in 
more detail. The dataset has promising  possibilities  for future research. I 
look  forward  to  seeing  the  next  installment  by  these  authors  in  their 
series of papers exploring  international  balance sheets. 
Comment 
JEFFREY  FRANKEL 
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In  1985,  U.S.  statistics  showed  that  the  net  international  investment 
position  of the United  States had turned negative  for the first time since 
World War I. In 1989, it again  turned  negative  for the  first time  since 
World War I.  How  is  that  possible?  In the  meantime,  a revision  had 
raised the valuation  of U.S. assets overseas,  by recognizing,  for example, 
increased  prices  of capital assets  acquired in the distant past.  This revi- 
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sion  was  large enough  to restore America's  net  creditor status,  though 
only temporarily. 1  The magnitude  of this revision  is one indicator of how 
large the measurement  errors in these  data are, or at least how  bad they 
have been  in the past,  which  in turn is one  reason why  they have  been 
so little used.  The worldwide  discrepancy  is another tangible illustration 
of the problem. 
That  said,  I am  persuaded  that  this  line  of  research  by  Lane  and 
Milesi-Ferretti  is  a very  useful  one.  In part this  is because  of the  high 
marginal product of research in an area where  few others have explored. 
But it is also because  the authors have been  able to put together  data for 
more countries  than were  available in the early 1980s. And the variation 
in the data is sufficiently  great that measurement  error need not necessar- 
ily prevent  us from learning  anything  by examining  them. 
Overall,  the  results  are  much  better  than  I would  have  predicted. 
There is little modeling  as such.  Instead,  they offer a variety  of theoreti- 
cal reasons  for thinking  that income  per capita, public  debt,  and demo- 
graphics  should  each have  effects  on the net foreign-asset  position,  and 
these  tend  to  be  borne  out  in  the  empirical  results.  In  the  case  of 
industrialized  countries,  income  per  capita has  a strong  positive  effect 
on the  asset  position,  supporting  the idea  that countries  become  credi- 
tors as they  grow  rich. (This certainly  fits the experience  of the Nether- 
lands  and the United  Kingdom  in their heydays,  the United  States until 
the 1980s, and Japan. The United  States in recent years is a conspicuous 
outlier.) 
Public debt seems  to have a negative  effect on the investment  position, 
as hypothesized.  This effect  is even  stronger  among  developing  coun- 
tries than  among  industrialized  countries.  The authors  explain  the  dis- 
crepancy by the argument  that credit constraints  are pervasive  in devel- 
oping  countries.  But I would  have  thought  that  credit  constraints  for 
these  countries  are even  worse  internationally  (capital controls,  default 
risk, recurrent  crises,  absence  of international  bankruptcy  court)-that 
they  would  find it even  harder to finance budget  deficits  out of foreign 
borrowing  than out of domestic  borrowing.  I consider  this result to be a 
bit  paradoxical,  but  it  is  the  same  paradox  found  in  the  Feldstein- 
Horioka  literature:  the  saving  retention  coefficient  is  even  higher  for 
industrialized  countries  than for developing  countries,  which  seems  in- 
consistent  with  the higher  capital mobility  that we  expect for industrial- 
1. The U.S.  data system  tends  to collect better data on  capital flowing  in than  on  capital 
flowing  out.  No  comprehensive  survey  of U.S.  residents'  holdings  of foreign  securities 
had been  conducted  since World War II, until one was  conducted  in 1994 (Kester et al., 
1995). (Measured  U.S.  net indebtedness  is $1.474 trillion as of end  1999, and still climb- 
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ized countries.2 The big question  that this research should  try to answer 
is analogous  to the one addressed  by the earlier Feldstein-Horioka  litera- 
ture: Are  net  international  investment  positions  as large  as we  would 
expect  from neoclassical  theory  and perfect  capital mobility,  and if not, 
why  not? 
The claim is made that economic  theory has stronger predictions  about 
the long-run  relationships  among  asset  stocks  than about short-run  re- 
lationships  among  flows.  By way  of elaboration,  the point  is made  that 
theory predicts that the stock of foreign assets should  depend  negatively 
on the stock of government  debt,  but that the relationship  between  the 
current-account  deficit  and  the  budget  deficit  depends  entirely  on  the 
origin of the shocks.3I  think the point is to look at low-frequency  relation- 
ships,  not at long-term  capital, whether  stock or flow. Perhaps the title of 
the paper should be Long-Term Movements  of Capital, rather than Long- 
Term Capital Movements. 
The third finding  is that demographics  matter as well,  with the young 
population  reducing  the  asset  position  and the peak-earning  fifties age 
cohort adding  to it.4 
Next  come  estimates  with  dynamic  adjustment.  The authors estimate 
the  half-life  at five  years,  and  describe  this behavior  of the  investment 
position  as quite persistent.  I would  have expected  slower  adjustment,  if 
anything,  and  am  surprised  it is  not  more persistent.  I suspect  that  if 
adjustment  were  solely  by  current-account  surpluses  and  deficits,  the 
half-life  might  be  longer  than  five  years,  and  that  the  estimates  are 
picking up variation in exchange  rates and asset prices. 
In the  dynamic  estimates,  and  the  panel  estimates,  the  results  work 
less  well  for the  United  States,  Japan, Germany,  and  the  United  King- 
dom.  Could  this be because  these  are the countries  that borrow primar- 
ily  in  their  own  currency?  A  key  question  is  whether  we  should  be 
thinking of the kind of portfolio balance model where investors  diversify 
across  currencies  of  denomination,  or  the  kind  where  they  diversify 
across  countries  of issuance.  Among  other  questions  that turn on  this 
2. See,  e.g.,  Dooley,  Frankel, and Mathieson  (1987). 
3. The latter point is certainly true. In the 1980s the U.S. current account grew worse  when 
the  budget  deficit  widened,  because  the  origin  was  fiscal  expansion,  whereas  in  the 
1990s the current account  grew  worse  when  the budget  improved,  because  both  were 
responding  to a New  Economy  investment  boom.  But is the situation  really so different 
with  stocks  rather than  flows?  Mightn't  theory  predict  that the  sign  of the  correlation 
between  the stock of foreign  assets  and the stock of government  debt would  reverse,  if 
the driving  force were  a New  Economy  boom  that raised the return to capital? 
4. The paper mentions  that "the over-65 age group exerts a negative  effect, consistent  with 
the running  down  of NFA." In the case of those who  have newly  retired, I would  expect 
a positive  effect on the level of assets.  Only for the very old, those who have lived longer 
than expected,  might  one  look for a negative  effect. 130 *  FRANKEL 
decision,  if it is  a matter  of currency  risk rather than  country  (default 
risk),  it may  be  necessary  to  express  foreign  holdings  relative  to  total 
portfolio  (wealth) rather than relative to income or exports as the authors 
do throughout. 
I see  several remaining  puzzles  and priorities for future research: 
1.  The relationship  between  income  and investment  position  appears to 
have  an  inverted-U  shape.  This  follows  from  the  finding  that  the 
relationship  is  positive  for  one  income  range  and  negative  for an- 
other.  If  so,  the  relationship  would  be  analogous  to  the  original 
Kuznets  curve,  which  said that income  inequality  gets worse  at early 
stages  of industrialization,  and then starts to get better when  income 
passes  a turning  point,  and  to the  so-called  environmental  Kuznets 
curve,  which  says  that the same  pattern  holds  for pollution.  We ob- 
serve  that  high  debt  brings  with  it vulnerability  to  financial  crisis. 
Perhaps all three variables-inequality,  pollution,  and debt-are  un- 
pleasant  side  effects of growth  that people  are willing  to put up with 
at  early  stages  when  maximizing  GDP  is  the  overriding  goal,  but 
which  they  can afford to reduce  when  they  get  richer. The  authors 
indeed  find  some  evidence  of  the  U-shaped  relationship  between 
income  and investment  in cross-section  data. The puzzle  is that they 
do not find it in time-series  data. 
2.  As  the  authors  say,  future  research  should  attempt  to  distinguish 
among  different  components  of the  net  investment  position,  break- 
ing  out  FDI,  equities,  and  long-term  debt  from  short-term  debt- 
though  it might  be  necessary  at the  same  time  to  break  out  gross 
assets  from gross liabilities.  I think we have decided,  in the aftermath 
of the financial crises of the 1990s, that the composition  of net capital 
flows  is as important  as the total magnitude. 
3.  I would  suggest  trying  a more  sophisticated  approach  to measuring 
the rate-of-return variable. 
A lot can be said on this last problem. 
The  authors  decompose  the  expected  return  differential  into  two 
components-a  real interest differential  and expected  real appreciation: 
ii(t) -  iw(t) -  Et  st+  =  (ii(t) -  Et  pi(t+l))  -  (iw(t) -  Et  A  w(t+l)) 
-(E,  Ast+1 -  Et Apt(t+) +  Et APW(t+l)). 
Since the latter component  is generally  insignificant  in their results,  they 
are in effect saying  that expected  return differentials  are determined  by Comment  131 
differences  in real interest  rates.  I am not  sure if this will  give  the right 
answer  in general.  Interest rates  (real as well  as nominal)  in Japan, for 
example,  have  been  below  those  in  the  U.S.  for most  of  the  postwar 
period, yet this difference  has been approximately  offset-perhaps  more 
than  offset,  depending  on  the  measure-by  the  upward  trend  in  the 
value  of the yen  (which  in real terms averaged  3% a year). Because  yen 
appreciation  was  such  a strong  trend,  Japanese  bonds  paid  more  than 
American  bonds  despite  their  low  interest  rate.  In  other  words,  real 
appreciation  of the yen  may have been  large enough  to change  the sign 
of the difference  in expected  returns.5 
At the one-year horizon,  there is good reason for thinking that specula- 
tors expect  the real exchange  rate to regress  gradually  toward purchas- 
ing  power  parity  (PPP), at least  among  the  dollar and  major European 
currencies.  (Forget the yen.)  Actually, there are two reasons  for thinking 
so. First, survey data suggest  that expectations  of market participants are 
formed  in this way. Second,  studies  of PPP suggest  that the actual real- 
exchange-rate  process  has  an  autoregressive  component,  and  rational 
expectations  implies  that  investors'  expectations  would  in  turn  be 
formed  in this way. 
Let me make a pitch for inverting  the equation-running  it with  rates 
of return on the left-hand  side and asset position  on the right. Write the 
demand  for domestic  assets  as a linear function  of the expected  return 
differential: 






rw(t+l)  =  -1  +  1Xt)+  t+l 
1.  The  logic  is  that  measurement  errors in  the  rates  of  return  (e)  are 
large. 
2.  If the rates of return are measured  as ex post  returns,  then  there is a 
theoretical  argument  for  believing  that  these  large  measurement 
errors-which  are investors'  ex  post  prediction  errors-are  uncor- 
5. Frankel  (1991,  Section 8.2). When Japan  removed its capital  controls  after 1979, the net 
flow was out rather  than in. So perhaps the real interest differentials  are giving us the 
right answer. (This  would be easier to understand  if we were talking about flows. The 
low real interest  rate in Japan  signals an excess of national  saving relative  to real invest- 
ment, and the high real  interest  rate  in the United States  signals the reverse;  the discrep- 
ancy in each country  is the net capital  flow.) 132 *  FRANKEL 
related with  the ex ante asset  quantity  variable. That theoretical  rea- 
son  is,  of  course,  rational  expectations.  Let us  accept  the  standard 
rational-expectations  methodology  for present  purposes. 
3.  This specification  readily lends  itself to intuitive  interpretation  as the 
answer  to the  question:  "If I increase  my international  indebtedness 
by one percentage  point,  by how  much do I drive up the interest rate 
I have  to pay?" 
4.  If one wants  to test the null hypothesis  of perfect capital mobility, it is 
much easier to test f-1  =  0 than it is to test 13  = o. 
5.  You can have  fun  imposing  the  constraint  that  3 is  determined  by 
optimal  portfolio  diversification,  which  can  give  you  the  constraint 
that the coefficient  matrix is proportional  to the variance of the error 
term  e  in  the same equation. Going  to  the  multidimensional  case  is 
optional,  where  f3-1 is  a  matrix,  proportional  to  the  variance- 
covariance matrix of e: 
3-1  =  pE(se'). 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti do invert the equation in Section 5, to the extent 
of putting  the  ex post  real interest  differential  on  the  left-hand  side.  I 
might understand  proceeding  in this manner if the logic were that we are 
talking about assets other than bonds  here (e.g.,  FDI), so that some broad 
measure  of real return to equity  is what matters. That gets into the other 
point about decomposing  the aggregate  investment  position  into FDI vs. 
bonds  etc. But let us stay with the idea of one aggregate asset.  If that one 
asset  were  short-term  default-free  bills,  then  the  only  source  of uncer- 
tainty would  be in the exchange rate, for those countries able to borrow in 
their own  currency: 
ri(t+l) -  rw(t+) 
= 
ii(t) -  iw(t) -  Et Ast+1. 
This case  is particularly simple,  and  allows  one  to model  and measure 
the first and  second  moments  with  some  precision.  But it requires  also 
getting  data on  the  stocks  of domestic  and  foreign  assets  that are out- 
standing  and that thus have  to be held by someone,  not just net domes- 
tic debt  to  foreigners.  Indeed,  the  net  international  indebtedness  vari- 
able,  which  is  the  focus  of  this  paper,  does  not  enter  into  the  asset 
supplies  at all. Rather, to get net indebtedness  to matter, it has to come 
in as a determinant  of demand  rather than supply,  assuming  a home bias 
in asset  demands.  Such  a home  bias is easy  to derive  from the  optimal 
diversification  framework, by the way, because  residents  of each country Comment. 133 
consume  more  of their own  goods,  and  so  each views  the  other's  cur- 
rency as somewhat  risky.6 
I am not  recommending  that  Lane and  Milesi-Ferretti  go  down  this 
route.  Their unique  contribution  is  working  with  the  data  on  the  net 
foreign-investment  position.  Their title and introduction  state explicitly 
that their motivation  is to shift  the  emphasis  from short-term  flows  to 
long.7 Long-term loans and bonds,  equities,  and FDI are as important as 
short-term bonds.  As their graphs  show,  equities  and FDI grew rapidly 
among  emerging  markets in the 1990s. In these  markets,  default risk has 
been  as important  as exchange  risk. So the  authors  need  not  focus  on 
short-term  interest  rates and  exchange  rates in measuring  expected  re- 
turns. And  they need  not get sidetracked  cumulating  government  bond 
supplies  in each country. 
Even  at the  stage  where  the  authors  continue  to  aggregate  all asset 
categories  together,  I would  like  to  propose  trying  an  alternative  ap- 
proach  for  measuring  the  aggregate  rate  of  return: the  net investment 
income line  of  the  balance  of  payments,  expressed  relative  to  the  net 
international  investment  position. 
There are certainly  problems  with  this  strategy.  Even  if the  data are 
measured  accurately, a serious  problem  arises if investment  income  and 
the  investment  position  are  of  opposite  signs,  as  they  were  for  the 
United States from 1989 until mid-1998. There is no cure for this problem 
except  to do the disaggregation.  In addition,  there are serious  errors in 
the  measurement  of  investment  income.  They  are probably  a leading 
source of both the world current-account discrepancy  ("horizontal") and 
the  statistical  discrepancy  in the  U.S.  balance  of payments  ("vertical"). 
Nevertheless,  these  errors are quite on a par with  those  in the measure- 
ment  of  the  net  international-investment  position  itself,  and  it seems 
appropriate  to study  these  two important  but neglected  series together. 
The advantage  is that you  then  can avoid  deciding  what kind of asset 
you  are thinking  about,  and  also  can  throw  the  questions  of  how  to 
6. In the framework  of mean-variance  optimization  with  nonstochastic  goods  prices,  the 
home  bias  in asset  preferences  is equal  to the  home  bias in consumption  preferences, 
times  a factor equal to 1 minus  the reciprocal of the coefficient  of relative risk aversion. 
(See, e.g.,  Frankel, 1994, p.  11.) 
7. They describe  the Feldstein-Horioka  literature as focusing  on short-term capital flows. 
But in fact Feldstein and Horioka gave as motivation  for their paper the observation  that 
the existing interest-rate parity literature focused  on short-term capital mobility, and their 
goal was to address long-term capital mobility. In my view  the distinction between  short- 
term and long is misplaced  here. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti want to talk about net stocks of 
assets,  whereas  the  earlier literature  they  have  in  mind  talks  about  flows.  Perhaps  a 
(second)  change  of title is in order: it should  be something  like Long-Term Patterns in 
International  Investment.  And  similarly, the contribution  of Feldstein  and Horioka was 
not to shift attention  from short term to long,  but rather from prices to quantities. 134 *  DISCUSSION 
measure the real interest rates and expected  changes  in the real exchange 
rate out the window  and estimate an equation like (2) above. You can even 
impose  the constraint  that /-1  is proportional  to the variance of 8. 
I look  forward  to future installments  of this work,  whether  along  the 
lines  of my suggestion  or not. 
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Discussion 
Philip Lane responded  to Kristin Forbes by saying  that the possibility  of 
a nonlinear  relationship  between  net foreign  assets  and income  was not 
addressed  in  the  time  series  because  of  the  difficulty  of  incorporating 
nonlinearities  in a cointegration  framework.  In particular, in this case the 
relationship  might  have  more  than  one  turning  point.  Lane explained 
that they  did not put  savings  and investment  directly  into their regres- 
sions because  they wanted  a parsimonious  model,  and demography  and 
income could affect net foreign assets through many channels,  including 
savings  and investment.  He agreed with Jeff Frankel that the issue  of net 
investment  income  relative  to net  foreign-asset  position  is as yet  unex- 
plored.  He said that, in practice, the composition  of net foreign  assets is 
important  for this relationship. 
Mark Gertler said that, leaving  aside  credit market imperfections,  the 
basic  neoclassical  model  suggests  that  a  country's  future  investment 
opportunities  should  determine  its  net  foreign-asset  position.  Ideally, 
the researcher would  like to have  a measure  of Tobin's q by country. He 
noted  that the  investment-capital  ratio could  be  a proxy  for Tobin's q 
under  certain  conditions,  which  could  explain  why  the  investment- 
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measure the real interest rates and expected  changes  in the real exchange 
rate out the window  and estimate an equation like (2) above. You can even 
impose  the constraint  that /-1  is proportional  to the variance of 8. 
I look  forward  to future installments  of this work,  whether  along  the 
lines  of my suggestion  or not. 
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capital  ratio  worked  so  well  in  the  regressions  presented  by  Kristin 
Forbes.  Rick Mishkin  agreed,  suggesting  that the return to capital rela- 
tive to the pool of domestic  savings  is the first-order factor to investigate 
as a determinant  of net foreign-asset  positions.  David Romer also agreed 
with  Gertler and Mishkin  that fundamentals  were  of first-order impor- 
tance and should  be taken into account more explicitly. 
Charles Engel  was  skeptical  of the  possibility  of estimating  long-run 
equilibrium  relationships  based  on the 30 years of data collected  by the 
authors.  First,  he  thought  convergence  would  be  slow,  and  second, 
there could be structural breaks in the estimated  relationship.  He would 
have preferred to see  the authors examine  short-run relationships  using 
their  data.  He  was  also  worried  by  the  fact that  the  estimated  model 
appeared  to work well  for small countries,  but not for the United  States, 
Japan,  and  Germany.  He  was  not  happy  with  the  use  of  net  foreign 
assets  relative  to GDP, instead  of wealth.  In a stock-market  boom,  this 
measure  makes  the United  States look risky, even  though  most  of U.S. 
stock  is  held  by  Americans.  He  would  have  preferred  to  see  a better 
measure  of countries'  ability to pay off their debts. 
Jaume  Ventura  raised  the  issue  of  the  direction  of  causality  in  the 
relationship between  interest-rate differentials and net foreign-asset  posi- 
tions.  The authors  assumed  that rate differentials  were  high because  of 
risk premia.  But from  a portfolio-balance  perspective,  causality  could 
run in the opposite  direction.  Lane responded  that the interest  rates in 
question  were  interest  rates on bonds,  so,  given  arbitrage, the differen- 
tial should  be  determined  by  expected  exchange-rate  changes  and  risk 
premia alone. 
Greg Mankiw said the data set collected by the authors would  be very 
useful.  He  would  have  liked  to  see  correlations  between  net  foreign 
assets  and  the  right-hand-side  variables  used  in  growth  theory.  This 
would  give  some  idea  of  the  theories  one  should  look  at in  trying  to 
explain net foreign-asset  positions.  In response,  Ventura said he had run 
regressions  where net foreign assets relative to wealth  (rather than GDP) 
were  the  dependent  variable,  with  standard  variables  from growth  re- 
gressions  on the right-hand  side.  In these  regressions,  he noted,  wealth 
explained  most of the variation in net foreign assets.  The other variables, 
such  as human  capital and political  institutions,  came  in with  the  right 
sign,  but explained  little of the variation  in net  foreign-asset  positions. 
Michael Klein was  curious  about what happened  to net foreign assets 
in the runup to crises. Are changes  in net foreign assets generally  transi- 
tory or persistent  around crises? 
Lane agreed  that in theory  fundamentals  matter,  and  countries  with 
high marginal products  of capital should  see capital inflows.  But he said 136 *  DISCUSSION 
that in practice, things were not so simple,  as political-economy  consider- 
ations were also very important. 
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti also defended  the use  of income  per capita 
rather than  investment  opportunities  as  a determinant  of net  foreign- 
asset  positions.  In standard  open-economy  models  the  two  are corre- 
lated,  so this is appropriate.  On breaks in the data, he felt that research- 
ers should  not give up estimating  long-run relationships  on this account; 
instead,  they  should  investigate  whether  breakpoints  are systematically 
related to certain variables. 